network profile
| bio | website | |
|---|---|---|
| location | ||
| age | ||
| visits | member for | 5 months |
| seen | Mar 18 at 12:26 | |
| stats | profile views | 2 |
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May 3 |
awarded | Teacher |
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Jan 16 |
comment |
Why is proof-by-reduction needed (for Elgamal proof of security, for example)? why don't they have the same distribution? they're both uniform distributions over the same group. |
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Jan 16 |
revised |
Why is proof-by-reduction needed (for Elgamal proof of security, for example)? edited title |
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Jan 16 |
asked | Why is proof-by-reduction needed (for Elgamal proof of security, for example)? |
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Jan 2 |
answered | What are monotonic and non monotonic access structures in ABE ? |
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Dec 24 |
awarded | Supporter |
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Dec 24 |
accepted | Security model for privacy-preserving aggregation scheme. |
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Dec 21 |
asked | Security model for privacy-preserving aggregation scheme. |
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Dec 11 |
asked | What are the cryptographic assumptions in the Dolev Yao model? |
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Dec 10 |
comment |
Why are protocols often proven secure under the random oracle model instead of a hash assumption? I was veering more towards the proof technique in the random oracles. It is not by simply replacing the random oracle with a perfect random function we can arrive at the same proof in the standard model. But what seems troubling to me is the fact that security proof in the random oracle allows the simulator to see the oracle queries made by the adversary. Is there any justification for this? Or is this simply that we cannot do without this assumption? |
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Dec 9 |
awarded | Editor |
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Dec 9 |
awarded | Scholar |
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Dec 9 |
awarded | Student |
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Dec 7 |
asked | Why are protocols often proven secure under the random oracle model instead of a hash assumption? |
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Dec 7 |
accepted | The security proof for Key Policy Attribute Based Encryption |
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Dec 7 |
answered | The security proof for Key Policy Attribute Based Encryption |
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Dec 4 |
comment |
The security proof for Key Policy Attribute Based Encryption I re-phrased the question by quoting the proof from paper. I used different notations in my original question, which probably cause misunderstanding. |
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Dec 4 |
revised |
The security proof for Key Policy Attribute Based Encryption added the quote from the proof, re-phrasing the question |
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Nov 30 |
comment |
The security proof for Key Policy Attribute Based Encryption I'm not sure if that is the case, because what being played here is the Decisional BHD game between the challenger and the simulator. The simulator gets inputs from the challenger (gγ,gλ,gβ,h) and tries to outputs b=0 or b=1 depending if h=gγλβ. In order to do that, the simulator plays a game with the ABE adversary in the selective set model. Now for this being the game, and for the fact that *PolyUnSat*(T,A,gγ) was used by the simulator to generate the key for all T such that T(A)=0, I don't think that the simulator knows what γ is. |
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Nov 28 |
asked | The security proof for Key Policy Attribute Based Encryption |
