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5h
answered Is this simple PRNG secure?
22h
answered How do attacks on WEP work?
1d
comment Elgamal with secret key equal to zero possible?
@SEJPM: actually, DJB sets the MSB of the secret key to be 1 so that implementations wouldn't be tempted to "optimize" things by skipping higher order 0 bits in an attempt to make things go faster (and add a timing side channel); he wasn't seriously concerned about someone using the all-0 key...
Apr
25
comment Why only one secret value with Shamir's secret sharing?
@mikeazo: I came to the same conclusion after I read it a bit more (although my answer there bears some insight into this question)
Apr
25
comment Why only one secret value with Shamir's secret sharing?
Note that, depending on the $d-1$ shares being known, this 'linear relationship' can be "$S_2$ is this specific value". This sort of thing doesn't happen with Shamir's original method.
Apr
24
answered What are the time considerations with regard to security against birthday attack?
Apr
24
comment Trying to udnerstand textbook sample solution
@Node.JS: how is that $D'$ related to the "real" one? How can Alice reconstruct a working $D$ from $D'$? Hint: $x^{-1} \bmod N$ can be computed, even if you don't know the factorization of $N$.
Apr
23
comment is accessing elements of an array in secret order vulnerable to timing attack?
One possible concern (which doesn't have anything to do with your question) is that a random permutation iterated twice is not a random permutation; for one, any point has double the expected probability of being a fixed point. It's easiest to see when considering the cycle structure; any odd-length cycle remains an odd-length cycle; any even-length cycle divides into 2 (so a length-8 cycle in the original becomes 2 length-4 cycles). Whether this is a concern depends on what you're using the permutation for...
Apr
23
wiki created isogeny description
Apr
23
wiki created isogeny excerpt
Apr
23
revised Finding the subgroup in isogeny-based cryptography
edited tags
Apr
23
comment Trying to udnerstand textbook sample solution
@Node.JS: well, yes; I don't feel like shouting in my equations...
Apr
23
answered Trying to udnerstand textbook sample solution
Apr
23
comment How to vary bit length of prime numbers in RSA by using MATLAB?
I'm voting to close this question as off-topic because this is a question about Matlab, not about cryptography
Apr
22
comment Can multi-prime RSA be used to create an abuse-resistant lawful interception mechanism?
Actually, with the submitter's system, if all three parties verify that the prime they were given was indeed prime, a factor of the modulus, of the expected size, and have the lsbits are the expected pattern (so all they must get different factors), and they verify with each other that they received the same modulus, then all three must jointly hold the complete factorization of that modulus.
Apr
22
reviewed Approve Why hash function are used in digital signatures?
Apr
22
comment Can multi-prime RSA be used to create an abuse-resistant lawful interception mechanism?
The problem with using Shamir's secret sharing is that it may be nontrivial to prove to the three entities that the shares you've given them is actually the shares to the real private key, and not a random value. Yes, you could design a ZKP for that, but that's a fall-out with wjv3's suggestion; all you need to do is have (say) supreme's court factor have lsbits (001), the executive's factor have lsbits (011) and congresses factor have lsbits (101). They can then validate that they have correct and distinct factors by exchanging public information.
Apr
22
comment Integer factorization still hard with Hamming weight hypothesis?
@Tal-Botvinnik: actually, if you look at my algorithm, I don't take all the $k$-bit candidates, and extend each candidate; instead, I preferentially expand the candidates that look likely (that is, have both $p$ and $q$ with light hamming weights); so I might be expanding some promising looking candidates at a large $k$ value, while not so promising candidates are sitting there at tiny $k$ values. Yes, it is possible that (in the extreme case) the lower 79 bits of $p$ are all 1 - if 78 of the 80 set bits were chosen from a uniform distribution, that is extremely unlikely.
Apr
22
comment Squaring and multiply function in encryption algorithm
In AES? AES doesn't actually use a square operation internally (and the GF multiplication it does is very different than what's in ElGamal or RSA).
Apr
22
comment Integer factorization still hard with Hamming weight hypothesis?
@Tal-Botvinnik: because we're looking for solutions with mostly 0's on both $p$ and $q$. Sure, we could scan through the values of $p$ with hamming weight $p$, but most such $p$s will have $q$ with a large hamming weight (even if we ignore what happens with the higher order bits). That this does is search preferentially for lightweight $p$ and $q$ values