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| visits | member for | 1 year, 9 months |
| seen | 1 hour ago | |
| stats | profile views | 105 |
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Mar 2 |
answered | What should be the size of a Diffie-Hellman private key? |
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Mar 2 |
comment |
Is the new preprint “An Algorithm For Factoring Integers” by Yingpu Deng and Yanbin Pan worth reading? @Someone: the use of the additional modulo operation was certainly inspired by that use of the modulo within the AKS test; however, the current authors fail to justify why the polynomial coefficients might be interesting. The AKS test uses the fact that if the result of that is not congruent to the polynomial $x^n + a$, then $n$ is not prime; AKS says nothing about what the polynomial may be if it is not congruent, and the paper gives no justification (either theoretical or experimental) for us the expect the coefficients of that polynomial to be at all interesting. |
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Mar 1 |
answered | Is the new preprint “An Algorithm For Factoring Integers” by Yingpu Deng and Yanbin Pan worth reading? |
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Mar 1 |
revised |
Signing a GCM MAC Fixed a thinko (which doesn't detract from my main point) |
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Mar 1 |
revised |
Signing a GCM MAC Provided more details |
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Mar 1 |
answered | Signing a GCM MAC |
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Mar 1 |
answered | How large should a Diffie-Hellman p be? |
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Feb 28 |
revised |
Finding CRC collisions for specific divisor edited tags |
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Feb 28 |
revised |
Finding CRC collisions for specific divisor Expanded the explanation somewhat |
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Feb 28 |
answered | Finding CRC collisions for specific divisor |
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Feb 28 |
comment |
How to construct a zero-knowledge proof of a number of the form $n=p^a q^b$ @statham: well, it is not weird at all if the simulator makes assertions that it does not know whether they are true. Of example, the simulator will be asserting that n had two prime factors; it need not know that (and must produce a valid-looking transcript even if that is not true). BTW: the simulator needn't produce a ZK proof that a number is QNR; all the simulator needs to simulate is that a sufficient number of the values are QR. Also, as for leaking the factor that verifier-chosen numbers are QR; that is easy to fix; we just need a way to select x values that neither side can control |
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Feb 28 |
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How to construct a zero-knowledge proof of a number of the form $n=p^a q^b$ @statham: Yes, I typo'ed it, and wrote "provider" when I meant "Verifer". However, despite the protocol leaking whether a number is a QR, it would still appear that this is technically "Zero Knowledge", in the sense that the Verifier could build a simulator that, without knowing any of the properties of n, could still generate a transcript that is indistingushable from a transcript of a valid proof. |
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Feb 27 |
answered | How to construct a zero-knowledge proof of a number of the form $n=p^a q^b$ |
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Feb 26 |
comment |
secure multiparty computation for multiplication There doesn't appear to be a problem. If N=3 (for example), and if the result of round 1 was $(X,Y)$, then the result of round two is $(2^{3-k}d_1 d_2 d_3 \cdot X, 2^k d_1 d_2 d_3 \cdot Y)$, where the first party doesn't know the values $d_2, d_3$. Verifying a guessed value of k would involve solving a decisional Diffie-Hellman problem, and we assumed that they picked a group where that problem was hard. |
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Feb 25 |
answered | Sending KCV (key check value) with cipher text |
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Feb 24 |
comment |
secure multiparty computation for multiplication Thinking about this, I realized that while this protocol works in the "honest but curious" model, it is vulnerable to cheaters which don't follow the protocol. For example, if someone in round 2 gave their output as $(x \cdot X, y \cdot Y)$ (for values of $x$ and $y$ they knew), then the could deduce the value of $\sum b_i$ for everyone else at the end of the protocol. Whether or not this matters would depend on whether this attack model is relevent. |
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Feb 24 |
revised |
secure multiparty computation for multiplication edited body |
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Feb 24 |
answered | What is an efficient random number generation algorithm |
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Feb 24 |
answered | secure multiparty computation for multiplication |
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Feb 24 |
answered | How can I store a combination of multiple pass phrases? |