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Mar
2
answered What should be the size of a Diffie-Hellman private key?
Mar
2
comment Is the new preprint “An Algorithm For Factoring Integers” by Yingpu Deng and Yanbin Pan worth reading?
@Someone: the use of the additional modulo operation was certainly inspired by that use of the modulo within the AKS test; however, the current authors fail to justify why the polynomial coefficients might be interesting. The AKS test uses the fact that if the result of that is not congruent to the polynomial $x^n + a$, then $n$ is not prime; AKS says nothing about what the polynomial may be if it is not congruent, and the paper gives no justification (either theoretical or experimental) for us the expect the coefficients of that polynomial to be at all interesting.
Mar
1
answered Is the new preprint “An Algorithm For Factoring Integers” by Yingpu Deng and Yanbin Pan worth reading?
Mar
1
revised Signing a GCM MAC
Fixed a thinko (which doesn't detract from my main point)
Mar
1
revised Signing a GCM MAC
Provided more details
Mar
1
answered Signing a GCM MAC
Mar
1
answered How large should a Diffie-Hellman p be?
Feb
28
revised Finding CRC collisions for specific divisor
edited tags
Feb
28
revised Finding CRC collisions for specific divisor
Expanded the explanation somewhat
Feb
28
answered Finding CRC collisions for specific divisor
Feb
28
comment How to construct a zero-knowledge proof of a number of the form $n=p^a q^b$
@statham: well, it is not weird at all if the simulator makes assertions that it does not know whether they are true. Of example, the simulator will be asserting that n had two prime factors; it need not know that (and must produce a valid-looking transcript even if that is not true). BTW: the simulator needn't produce a ZK proof that a number is QNR; all the simulator needs to simulate is that a sufficient number of the values are QR. Also, as for leaking the factor that verifier-chosen numbers are QR; that is easy to fix; we just need a way to select x values that neither side can control
Feb
28
comment How to construct a zero-knowledge proof of a number of the form $n=p^a q^b$
@statham: Yes, I typo'ed it, and wrote "provider" when I meant "Verifer". However, despite the protocol leaking whether a number is a QR, it would still appear that this is technically "Zero Knowledge", in the sense that the Verifier could build a simulator that, without knowing any of the properties of n, could still generate a transcript that is indistingushable from a transcript of a valid proof.
Feb
27
answered How to construct a zero-knowledge proof of a number of the form $n=p^a q^b$
Feb
26
comment secure multiparty computation for multiplication
There doesn't appear to be a problem. If N=3 (for example), and if the result of round 1 was $(X,Y)$, then the result of round two is $(2^{3-k}d_1 d_2 d_3 \cdot X, 2^k d_1 d_2 d_3 \cdot Y)$, where the first party doesn't know the values $d_2, d_3$. Verifying a guessed value of k would involve solving a decisional Diffie-Hellman problem, and we assumed that they picked a group where that problem was hard.
Feb
25
answered Sending KCV (key check value) with cipher text
Feb
24
comment secure multiparty computation for multiplication
Thinking about this, I realized that while this protocol works in the "honest but curious" model, it is vulnerable to cheaters which don't follow the protocol. For example, if someone in round 2 gave their output as $(x \cdot X, y \cdot Y)$ (for values of $x$ and $y$ they knew), then the could deduce the value of $\sum b_i$ for everyone else at the end of the protocol. Whether or not this matters would depend on whether this attack model is relevent.
Feb
24
revised secure multiparty computation for multiplication
edited body
Feb
24
answered What is an efficient random number generation algorithm
Feb
24
answered secure multiparty computation for multiplication
Feb
24
answered How can I store a combination of multiple pass phrases?