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| bio | website | |
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| location | ||
| age | ||
| visits | member for | 4 months |
| seen | yesterday | |
| stats | profile views | 2 |
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May 9 |
comment |
RSA leak bits to factor N You'd have to look at semismoothness probabilities in the vicinity of p and q to see if you could just search. I believe my idea is likely to win because there's the opportunity to do work on the sending side to encode the information and then more work on the receiving side whereas just leaking bits from $p$ requires the receiver to do all the work. If you could allow the primes to be not chosen uniformly at random but at random from a particular distribution which should have no effect on security then coming up with a suitable curve should be easy using complex multiplication. |
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May 9 |
answered | How to derive formulas for addition and multiplication in Jacobian coordinates |
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May 7 |
comment |
What does $(\mathbb{Z}_n^*)^2$ mean? How about a link to the paper? Is it about cryptography? |
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May 7 |
answered | RSA leak bits to factor N |
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May 7 |
answered | Solving a discrete logarithm using GDlog |
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Apr 29 |
comment |
Adding and multiplication in jacobian coordinates This is the relevant page of the Explicit-Formulas Database (thanks @CodesInChaos) |
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Apr 13 |
comment |
ElGamal: Generation of “g” value? I have experienced people being quite negative about efficiency gains from having $g=2$. I haven't investigated so I have no opinion. Also, I found abc's answer to this post which would lead people (wrongly) to believe that $g=2$ is insecure for signatures in all cases. Perhaps you may care to leave a comment on the linked question to set the record straight for posterity. You have the gravitas I do not.. (yet!) |
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Apr 13 |
comment |
ElGamal: Generation of “g” value? However, if you look at Appendix A.2 of FIPS 186-3 (the Digital Signature Standard) you will find a more comprehensive treatment of similar issues which boils down to pretty much the same thing. |
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Apr 12 |
comment |
ElGamal: Generation of “g” value? If your maths knowledge is such that you can't see the truth of this when it's pointed out to you then the best solution is for you to brush up on your maths rather than for me to find someone who agrees with me. |
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Apr 12 |
revised |
ElGamal: Generation of “g” value? fixed obvious typo and added link |
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Apr 12 |
suggested | suggested edit on ElGamal: Generation of “g” value? |
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Apr 12 |
answered | ElGamal: Generation of “g” value? |
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Apr 9 |
comment |
ECKS-PS algorithm: searching in encrypted data; bilinear maps Looking through your first page of notes (which I don't find easy to read) I notice that you appear to have e(i,j)=53^(i*j) mod 59 where I would normally read e to be some suitable paring computation on an elliptic curve. I presume you believe you're allowed to make this substitution to make thing simpler but it's not clear to me that it's actually going to work. Is this something you can justify? |
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Feb 10 |
revised |
Request for 1024-bit primes $p$ , subgroup $q$ and subgroup generator $g$ more specific answer based on questioners comments |
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Feb 10 |
revised |
Request for 1024-bit primes $p$ , subgroup $q$ and subgroup generator $g$ added info from author comment |
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Feb 10 |
suggested | suggested edit on Request for 1024-bit primes $p$ , subgroup $q$ and subgroup generator $g$ |
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Feb 10 |
suggested | suggested edit on Request for 1024-bit primes $p$ , subgroup $q$ and subgroup generator $g$ |
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Feb 7 |
comment |
Is such a crypto-system available? @poncho Good answer BTW! You say that with my solution, if Eve and Bob collude then they can read the entire text. I can't work out what assumptions you must be making for this to be true, but yet for the scheme not to be rejected outright due to the absence of a selective disclosure property. In other words, how must the system be set up for collusion to be of any benefit? |
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Feb 3 |
answered | Why do the elliptic curves recommended by NIST use 521 bits rather than 512? |
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Feb 3 |
answered | Trapdoor implementation |
