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visits member for 1 year, 6 months
seen May 31 at 2:36

Feb
16
awarded  Yearling
Nov
5
answered What is so special about elliptic curves?
Nov
2
answered Can ECB mode really leak some characters?
Oct
14
answered How does GCM (Galois/Counter Mode) work?
Oct
11
answered Is using Ed25519 parameters in ECDSA safe?
Sep
3
answered Is it possible to translate a piece of language into your own without knowing the language?
Jul
5
answered DSA, RSA, ECDSA etc - which one is cheapest for signing?
Jun
23
comment When truncating an AES MAC value by “w” , how do I justify that “w” is still negligible?
csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/comments/CWC-GCM/… Because of the nature of the polynomial authenticator, there is a security gap that increases for small authenticator sizes. $p(x)$ has $d$ roots, so the chance of picking one is $d/q$ where $q$ is the field size. Here $q=2^k$, and so for small $k$ this is a bigger gap proportionally.
Jun
23
awarded  Editor
Jun
23
revised When truncating an AES MAC value by “w” , how do I justify that “w” is still negligible?
explained that not all MACs retain strength on truncation.
Jun
22
suggested suggested edit on When truncating an AES MAC value by “w” , how do I justify that “w” is still negligible?
Jun
16
comment Can cryptography be used to hide routing information from the router?
It's a way to implement a mixnet where users determine the mix. Just put in a Benes network as your function.
Jun
11
awarded  Commentator
Jun
11
comment Acceptable assumptions when proving security
There is such a field as provable security, reducing scheme and protocol security to that of hard problems.
Jun
1
comment Complex Numbers on Elliptic Curves & Usage in Tate Pairing
He's working over a quadratic extension, and the formulas work exactly the same as over any finite field.
Jun
1
answered Acceptable assumptions when proving security
Jun
1
awarded  Critic
Jun
1
comment Acceptable assumptions when proving security
This is about provable security, not documentation.
May
17
comment When truncating an AES MAC value by “w” , how do I justify that “w” is still negligible?
You were doing so well until the last sentence. Poly1305 and AES-GCM cannot be truncated, due to algebraic properties they have despite being information theoretically secure.
May
4
awarded  Citizen Patrol