76 reputation
6
bio website umd.edu
location Maryland
age 21
visits member for 1 year, 5 months
seen Feb 11 at 21:29

I'm a student at UMD majoring in CS and Math.


Feb
2
comment Breaking a PRNG Scheme
@jspencer, That would be a way to reduce the bias! Nonetheless, I'd like to know if the introduction of the bias, however small, could allow an attacker to gain knowledge in such a way to predict the subsequent numbers from the stream (or whether they will be within a threshold).
Jan
31
comment Breaking a PRNG Scheme
Correct me if I'm wrong, is not the probability that the last 3 hex characters are used equal to $\left(\frac{1048575-999999}{1048575}\right)^{25}$?
Jan
31
comment Breaking a PRNG Scheme
How can I clarify the algorithm in the case of the upper 3 digits? Here's my attempt: assume all 25 five-character hex-strings are >=1,000,000 in decimal. Convert the remaining 3-character hex-string to decimal that will have a range of [0,4096). Divide this by 100, yielding a range of [0,40.96) and return the result.
Jan
31
comment Breaking a PRNG Scheme
@figlesquidge, Sorry for all this confusion. The output should be in [0,100) with two-decimal precision (e.g. 40.96).
Jan
30
comment Breaking a PRNG Scheme
Forgive me, what is the meaning of "Let S = {min((t[19:0])/10000, 99) | t in T}", specifically, "t[19:0]"?
Jan
30
comment Breaking a PRNG Scheme
@jspencer, fgrieu informed me that when we say "in decimal" we're implying division by 100. Therefore, where it says "the remaining 3 hex digits are returned (in decimal)" the meaning "convert to decimal by division of 100 and representation of digits [0-9]" is implied.
Jan
21
comment Breaking a PRNG Scheme
I could see constructing a distinguisher that identifies this scheme vs. an actual RNG based on the fact that numbers [0,40.95] will appear slightly more often than others. Other than that, I'm still unsure of how to relate the distinguisher to predicting >=50 on return.
Jan
21
comment Breaking a PRNG Scheme
No, SHA256 on key, HMAC512 on message, key.
Mar
10
comment Is a known plaintext, ciphertext, and public-key a viable attack on RSA?
Can Cindy find $n_{A}$?