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network profile
| bio | website | randombit.net |
|---|---|---|
| location | Vermont | |
| age | 31 | |
| visits | member for | 1 year, 10 months |
| seen | Apr 19 at 16:07 | |
| stats | profile views | 24 |
Hobo in training
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Jan 22 |
awarded | Nice Question |
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Jul 12 |
awarded | Yearling |
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Jun 19 |
comment |
Are there standards for transport layer security using only symmetric keys? Probably so, which is why I mentioned CyaSSL which is designed for embedded. There is also MatrixSSL which also supports PSK. |
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Jun 19 |
answered | Are there standards for transport layer security using only symmetric keys? |
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Oct 11 |
awarded | Enlightened |
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Oct 11 |
awarded | Nice Answer |
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Aug 24 |
answered | Can you create a strong blockcipher with small blocksize, given a strong blockcipher of conventional blocksize? |
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Aug 10 |
awarded | Enthusiast |
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Aug 4 |
comment |
Tactics available to help prove security of a new system? +1, and I completely agree with the sentiment here, but want to make an addendum to "The hard bit is to design a cipher that no one else can break." - the really hard part is doing this while having something that is at all competitive from an implementation perspective. It wouldn't be that hard for someone with a decade or so of experience to come up with an algorithm that would be secure if you used, say, 10000 rounds, but which would probably not be secure if you wanted it to be as fast as, say, Rijndael or Twofish. Of course most such people know enough not to bother doing such things... |
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Aug 4 |
accepted | Are there security issues with discrete logarithm keys not being uniformly distributed? |
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Aug 4 |
awarded | Enlightened |
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Aug 4 |
awarded | Nice Answer |
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Aug 2 |
awarded | Beta |
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Jul 27 |
answered | Unpredictability of X.509 serial numbers |
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Jul 25 |
asked | Are there security issues with discrete logarithm keys not being uniformly distributed? |
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Jul 21 |
comment |
Should DES be avoided when developing new systems? It might be worth distinguishing between CBC and CTR in terms of the problems that are encountered with an n bit cipher. As I understand it, after 2**(n/2) CBC blocks, one can expect to start extracting information about the plaintext, whereas with CTR the only change is that you can distinguish the keystream from a uniform random string, because you would expect to see a collision after 2**(n/2) blocks, but wouldn't with CTR. Obviously the best solution regardless is to use a cipher with a larger block, but I do think these are very different failure modes. |
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Jul 21 |
revised |
Should DES be avoided when developing new systems? Expand a bit, link to time memory tradeoff paper |
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Jul 14 |
answered | Is key size the only barrier to the adoption of the McEliece cryptosystem, or is it considered broken/potentially vulnerable? |
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Jul 14 |
answered | Taking advantage of one-time pad key reuse? |
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Jul 14 |
awarded | Scholar |
