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4h
revised Generate RSA-2048 private key for a VERY fast decryption (don't care if it will be unsecure)
Improve the idea by picking up favorable primes.
5h
revised Is Curve25519 vulnerable to private key exposure in the case of a bad RNG?
Clarify
6h
comment Generate RSA-2048 private key for a VERY fast decryption (don't care if it will be unsecure)
I confirm the calculations. $\lambda(n)+1=e$
7h
revised Is Curve25519 vulnerable to private key exposure in the case of a bad RNG?
Explain why Curve25519 signature has this quality
7h
answered Is Curve25519 vulnerable to private key exposure in the case of a bad RNG?
9h
revised Generate RSA-2048 private key for a VERY fast decryption (don't care if it will be unsecure)
deleted 6 characters in body
9h
answered Generate RSA-2048 private key for a VERY fast decryption (don't care if it will be unsecure)
13h
revised DES hardware implementation of substitution lookup table [ ReWorked ]
Mention the PALCE22V10
19h
revised DES hardware implementation of substitution lookup table [ ReWorked ]
clarify depth of the proposed construction
19h
revised DES hardware implementation of substitution lookup table [ ReWorked ]
Explain a regularity of S-boxes, and a possible construction.
19h
revised DES hardware implementation of substitution lookup table [ ReWorked ]
Introduce the 2732 - remember these?
20h
answered DES hardware implementation of substitution lookup table [ ReWorked ]
1d
comment Can iterated hashing be used to mitigate collision and preimage weaknesses?
@boot4life: your justification is quite different from mine, and just as based on reasonable argument rather than proof. Indeed hashing twice makes twice as many rounds, which can increase security in some contexts; on top of that there is a major irregularity in the middle of the rounds, as we finalize the first hash, pad it, and reenter it as message for the other rounds, which arguably could help preimage security too - at least we have proof that it does not doom it!
1d
revised What security authorities and standards reject $e=3$ in RSA, when, and with what rationale?
Referenec to FIPS 186-4 rather than the obsolete -3
1d
comment Can iterated hashing be used to mitigate collision and preimage weaknesses?
@boot4life: see added Handwaving argument
1d
revised Can iterated hashing be used to mitigate collision and preimage weaknesses?
Add handwaving argument
1d
awarded  Good Question
1d
revised Can iterated hashing be used to mitigate collision and preimage weaknesses?
added 31 characters in body
1d
revised Can iterated hashing be used to mitigate collision and preimage weaknesses?
Answer the other aspect of the question
1d
revised Can iterated hashing be used to mitigate collision and preimage weaknesses?
Expand, synthetic answer.