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I'm an engineer with experience in applied cryptography, in particular in Smart Card systems.


May
26
revised What security authorities and standards reject $e=3$ in RSA, when, and with what rationale?
Proofreading
May
26
revised What security authorities and standards reject $e=3$ in RSA, when, and with what rationale?
Restructure. Add the important reference "New Attacks on PKCS#1 v1.5 Encryption"
May
26
revised What security authorities and standards reject $e=3$ in RSA, when, and with what rationale?
Found material in PKCS#1v2.2
May
26
revised What security authorities and standards reject $e=3$ in RSA, when, and with what rationale?
Some randomness is required for semantic security
May
26
revised What security authorities and standards reject $e=3$ in RSA, when, and with what rationale?
RSA is vulnerable when encrypting without random padding. Link to D. Coppersmith's article which seems to be the best justification for the ban of e=3. More precise references. Polish
May
25
revised What security authorities and standards reject $e=3$ in RSA, when, and with what rationale?
Fix per comment
May
25
revised What security authorities and standards reject $e=3$ in RSA, when, and with what rationale?
added 357 characters in body
May
25
revised How random are commercial TRNGS
Further polsih
May
25
revised What security authorities and standards reject $e=3$ in RSA, when, and with what rationale?
Add context in which I ask the question.
May
25
asked What security authorities and standards reject $e=3$ in RSA, when, and with what rationale?
May
25
revised How random are commercial TRNGS
Incorporate important restriction on the care and feeding of CSPRNG by @CodesInChaos
May
25
revised How random are commercial TRNGS
Move the RF beam attack where it belongs
May
25
revised How random are commercial TRNGS
Partial knowledge of PRNG might be enough for a break. Considerations on attacks of LFSR-based RNG, and CSPRNG period. Expand rationale for monitoring. Add other reference on AIS31. Other polishing.
May
24
revised How random are commercial TRNGS
Additions following comment
May
23
revised How random are commercial TRNGS
Discuss the thermal vs radio aspect of the question
May
23
revised How random are commercial TRNGS
Expand, add references, polish
May
23
revised How random are commercial TRNGS
typo
May
23
revised How random are commercial TRNGS
added 3088 characters in body
May
23
answered How random are commercial TRNGS
May
22
comment Increased CRC collision probability when adding bits to input message
@jmbeck: I'm proposing to trade a little usable space in the V2 format against improved error-detection capability. E.g. if V1 messages are 12-bytes payload + 1-byte CRC, V2 could be 10-bytes payload + 2-byte CRC/EDC + (K xor (1-byte CRC of the 12 previous bytes)), for some non-zero byte K to be decided from the polynomial (K=0xFF is rarely disastrous). The receiver computes the 1-byte V1 CRC of the first 12 bytes and uses that to reject the message or determine its type as V1 or V2, and (for V2) further checks the additional 2-bytes EDC/CRC. The undetected error rate is almost as good as V1.