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Jun
24
revised Attack for RSA 1024 bit with Low Public Exponent
Polish
Jun
24
revised Attack for RSA 1024 bit with Low Public Exponent
Extend Poncho's attack to any suitable $e$ and $N$. Expand conclusion.
Jun
23
revised Attack for RSA 1024 bit with Low Public Exponent
rename y to s and other polish
Jun
23
revised Attack for RSA 1024 bit with Low Public Exponent
Remove obscure reference to ANS X9.31
Jun
23
revised Attack for RSA 1024 bit with Low Public Exponent
Discuss what enables the attacks.
Jun
23
revised Attack for RSA 1024 bit with Low Public Exponent
Better credit
Jun
23
revised Attack for RSA 1024 bit with Low Public Exponent
Incorporate the technique in Poncho's comment
Jun
23
comment Attack for RSA 1024 bit with Low Public Exponent
@poncho: Great, that's what I was attempting in 5, done the right way, that I missed entirely! You nailed it!! I'll update the answer.
Jun
23
comment Attack for RSA 1024 bit with Low Public Exponent
@poncho: Had the same idea but you beat me on publishing first!
Jun
23
revised Attack for RSA 1024 bit with Low Public Exponent
Add another method; number these
Jun
23
revised Attack for RSA 1024 bit with Low Public Exponent
Fix page number in a link
Jun
23
revised Attack for RSA 1024 bit with Low Public Exponent
The goof that I mention might not be exaclty the one that occured in practice
Jun
23
revised Attack for RSA 1024 bit with Low Public Exponent
All paddings are recognizable
Jun
23
revised Attack for RSA 1024 bit with Low Public Exponent
polish
Jun
23
answered Attack for RSA 1024 bit with Low Public Exponent
Jun
23
comment What is the danger if a non-prime is chosen for RSA?
The question is very similar to this one. To summarize my answer: if it accidentally happened that we use a composite, most likely the RSA key pair would fail on first use (in a PKI: when the certification request is checked, thus thus wrong key would not get certified). Another option, so unlikely that the combination of bad luck and a hardware defect is not enough to cause it, is that it was picked a Charmichael number instead of a prime, in which case RSA will work.
Jun
22
awarded  Caucus
Jun
22
awarded  Constituent
Jun
22
comment What are the differences between collision attack and birthday attack?
@HeatfanJohn: Yes. In crypto we often use the approximation that a birthday attack on a fair hash of $n$ bits succeeds with odds near $1/2$ after $2^{n/2}$ hashes (if we are able to detect any collision that might occur). $2^{64}$ is 19% lower that the more precise estimate that you quote.
Jun
22
revised Collision or second preimage for the ChaCha core?
their->its