Reputation
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67/100 score
19/20 answers
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 Yearling
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~343k people reached

Aug
9
answered How many degrees of freedom up my sleeve?
Aug
9
reviewed Leave Open How many degrees of freedom up my sleeve?
Aug
9
reviewed Close Algebraic Normal Form Piccolo
Aug
9
reviewed Leave Open AES256-CBC vs AES256-CTR in SSH
Aug
9
reviewed Close Currently i am doing decryption for RSA encoding and i face some problem with it
Aug
9
reviewed Leave Open Theoretical attack on RSA
Aug
9
comment Recover from compromised shares with Shamir Secret Sharing
+1. Of course, it's worth noting that the dealer still needs to be trusted; a malicious dealer could construct their polynomial with a non-zero constant term, thereby changing the secret (potentially to one of their choosing, if they can guess the original secret).
Jul
23
awarded  Revival
Jul
23
answered Reordering non-block-aligned parts with DES in ECB mode
Jul
20
answered Spoofing protocol nonce
Jul
20
revised Spoofing protocol nonce
subscripts
Jul
20
revised Spoofing protocol nonce
subscripts
Jul
18
comment Is TripleDES 168bit vulnerable to Differential Cryptanalysis?
@owlstead: Agreed. Not only is it full of both factual and grammatical errors, but most of the text, or at least the more fluent parts of it, appears to be plagiarized. If this were an undergrad course assignment, I'd give it an F; since the authors appear to be grad students, and since it appears to have been published in something pretending to be a scientific journal...
Jul
14
awarded  Nice Answer
Jul
1
revised Exactly two of the four roots must be greater than N/2
add the symmetry argument to the answer; feel free to improve
Jun
28
revised Condensed ElGamal + AES
make Wikipedia URL non-mobile (and protocol-relative)
Jun
9
awarded  Nice Answer
Jun
5
reviewed Close AES/CBC fixed Initial vector use-case
Jun
5
reviewed Leave Open Use of Different keys with PCBC
Jun
4
comment Why is TLS SRP verifier based on user name?
@simbo1905: The compromised server wants to know if Alice and Bob have the same password. So, when Alice tries to log in, the server looks up Bob's authentication data $(s_{\rm Bob}, v_{\rm Bob})$ and sends Alice $s=s_{\rm Bob}$ and (in SRP-6) $B=3v_{\rm Bob}+g^b$, gets back $M_1$ and verifies that it equals $H(A,B,S)$, $S=(Av_{\rm Bob}^u)^b$. If it does, Alice has just successfully authenticated herself as Bob, which (with overwhelming likelihood) means they must have the same password $P$ and identifier $I$. Assigning each user a separate $I$ (typically, their username) plugs this hole.