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Mar
25
awarded  Popular Question
Mar
16
asked How can I create an RSA modulus for which no one knows the factors?
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awarded  Taxonomist
Sep
10
comment What NIST protocol was allegedly backdoored by NSA in 2006?
It wouldn't be the first time the media got something wrong; even the NYT makes technical mistakes occasionally. More likely, there is a wrong perception among researchers about the history of SP 800-90.
Sep
10
accepted What NIST protocol was allegedly backdoored by NSA in 2006?
Sep
10
awarded  Nice Question
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awarded  Custodian
Sep
8
reviewed Reject suggested edit on What NIST protocol was allegedly backdoored by NSA in 2006?
Sep
8
asked What NIST protocol was allegedly backdoored by NSA in 2006?
Aug
31
comment Recent attacks on RSA
Seems that Schneier (and other cryptographers) agree with me: schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/08/the_cryptopocal.html
Aug
30
awarded  Good Question
Aug
30
comment Do ciphertexts leak information about their algorithmic creators?
So if I say "I have 1024 bits of ciphertext" you can definitively ascertain whether that is an output from Rijndael-1024, or it's three blocks of AES-CBC with a random IV? I can't.
Aug
25
comment Do ciphertexts leak information about their algorithmic creators?
@Ninveh You're confusing block cipher encipherment with full-blown encryption again. The concept of an "IV" does not apply to AES, Twofish, Serpent, etc. That's an idea used with modes in order to (typically) implement randomization. So you can't say "IV structure in some ciphers". In any case, the normal approach to security in crypto is to NOT try to hide which algorithms have been used at all (unless you are the NSA).
Aug
24
answered Do ciphertexts leak information about their algorithmic creators?
Aug
24
awarded  Yearling
Aug
3
accepted Recent attacks on RSA
Aug
3
comment Recent attacks on RSA
Elliptic curve cryptanalysis has had 1/100th the attention of RSA and yet these guys want to run to it? I'm guessing if we start to convert to ECC, the recommended key lengths will quickly increase in the next few years.
Aug
3
comment Recent attacks on RSA
Thanks for posting this. I am not an algebraist, but breakthroughs in discrete log for small-characteristic finite fields doesn't seem particularly related to factoring in zero-characteristic rings like $\mathbb{Z}$. Of course it may be relevant to RSA (which is on the ring $\mathbb{Z}_N$) and despite many wrong proclamations in the cited articles, breaking RSA does not require factoring. In any case, in my opinion the presenters have overstepped in declaring a state of emergency with respect to RSA. Remember 10 years ago all the factorization papers (Bernstein and Shamir mostly)?