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Mar
20
comment How to deal with collisions in Bitcoin addresses?
Well, it seems that accidental collisions of Bitcoin account addresses is just considered as a "don't care" issue... Well, I guess I have my answer, then. :-)
Mar
19
comment How to deal with collisions in Bitcoin addresses?
Once again, I do not want to consider a malicious attacker, but a "shit happen" case. The fact that you have $1/2^{80}$ chance to get it does not means that this will never happen...
Mar
19
comment How to deal with collisions in Bitcoin addresses?
Well, I know that occurrences of such collisions will happen with a very low probability. And, this is fine for me. But, at least, I would have expected that, during the creation of a BTC address, one would check that the current address does not appear in the blockchain... But, still, this is not enough as the creation should occurs in a decentralized manner, so two addresses in collision might be created a the same time and checking the blockchain at the same time as well (I agree that we are here speaking of an extremely low probability).
Feb
4
comment What is the difference between SHA-3(Keccak) and previous generation SHA algorithms?
Not to mention that MD5 (which was clearly broken) was also based on the Merkle-Damgård scheme). So, they were real suspicions that flaws would be found soon.
Apr
11
comment OTP - Reuse key BUT add IV, is it secure enough?
@Alvin : Then, the keys are used only once and, there we go, you re-discovered OTP once again ! Congrats ! :-)
Feb
18
comment Is cryptanalysis of CTB-Locker really impossible?
I didn't mean "breaking ECC" or "breaking AES", I was more thinking about an error in the way the things have been arranged to build the whole encryption scheme or specificities that are linked to the very peculiar way the encryption is used here. For example, if you have a partial back-up of your file, you will have access to a reasonable quantity of cleartext/ciphertext couple that you may use. Or, is there a flaw in the entropy of the chosen keys... But, of course, I believe in the security of ECC and AES... I am not that naive !