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| bio | website | pwnhome.wordpress.com |
|---|---|---|
| location | ||
| age | ||
| visits | member for | 1 year, 8 months |
| seen | 59 mins ago | |
| stats | profile views | 66 |
I like crypto. Need I say more?
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May 16 |
comment |
Understanding Feldman's VSS with a simple example I think wikipedia is referring to the fact that if $g$ is a generator of $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$, then $(g^s \mid p)$ leaks the least significant bit of $s$ (HAC 3.9.1). Wikipedia only suggests choosing $g$ with prime order $q$ where $q\mid p-1$ in a parenthetical statement as kind of an afterthought. I'm assuming that is why they say $g^s$ leaks information. |
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May 16 |
revised |
Understanding Feldman's VSS with a simple example fixed a mistake using t instead of q |
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May 16 |
comment |
Understanding Feldman's VSS with a simple example Choosing $p,q$ in this manner ensures that the Legendre symbol of the secret $s$ is not leaked by the commitment $g^s$, correct? Specifically, the article on Wikipedia says the description of Feldman's VSS as written there is not secure as $g^s$ leaks information about $s$ (which I'm assuming is the Legendre symbol). Does choosing $p,q$ as you specify fix this problem? |
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May 15 |
comment |
calculating beta for elgamal elliptic curves The equations are in the answers I linked to. What exactly don't you understand. |
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May 15 |
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calculating beta for elgamal elliptic curves crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/3907/… might help too. |
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May 15 |
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calculating beta for elgamal elliptic curves $\alpha+\alpha+\alpha+\alpha+\alpha+\alpha+\alpha$ |
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May 13 |
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Why is the discrete log problem easy when the exponent comes from a binomial distribution? I'd add that lookup tables are especially useful here too. You must be willing to use more space, but for small plaintext spaces, it is very feasible. |
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May 13 |
reviewed | Approve suggested edit on Why is the following RSA PRNG cryptographically secure? |
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May 13 |
revised |
Why is the following RSA PRNG cryptographically secure? added 115 characters in body |
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May 13 |
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Why is the following RSA PRNG cryptographically secure? @Maeher, yes, let me reword to make it clear. Thanks for pointing that out. |
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May 13 |
answered | Why is the following RSA PRNG cryptographically secure? |
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May 11 |
revised |
Finding hash almost-collisions deleted 123 characters in body |
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May 10 |
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Finding hash almost-collisions @0xFE, if the problem is massively parallelizable, then hardware can make a huge difference. See cs.rit.edu/~ark/parallelcrypto/sha3test01 for more info (including some code). |
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May 10 |
revised |
Finding hash almost-collisions deleted 254 characters in body |
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May 10 |
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Finding hash almost-collisions @CodesInChaos, this is good. I need all the checking of my math I can get. You are right, it should be $2^{51}$ for a $.5$ probability. Threw in a little birthday problem math by mistake. |
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May 10 |
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Cryptography based upon neural networks @D.W., is right. The only reason I wrote an answer is because it wouldn't fit in a comment. |
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May 10 |
answered | Cryptography based upon neural networks |
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May 10 |
revised |
Finding hash almost-collisions added 5 characters in body |
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May 10 |
comment |
Is the DES algorithm in OPENSSL random? @vikkyhacks,Depending on your application, hiding the salt (much like hiding an IV or nonce) is unnecessary. The salt ensures the key is different from execution to execution making it such that the ciphertext is different even for the same plaintext/password. See also. |
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May 10 |
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Finding hash almost-collisions One problem I ran into when doing this is that the output of the Skein library I was using Skeinfish wasn't the same as what XKCD reported. They were apparently using PySkein which had a newer tweak to the key schedule constants. It took me a while to figure this out. |
