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  • 13 votes cast
Mar
23
comment Is RSA encryption without padding secure with NIST Key Establishment schemes?
@fgrieu: i understand that if rsa encryption applies to a random plaintext rather than to an applicative/structured message, textbook rsa encryption may be considered. However from my understanding most of rsa encryption applications is to distribute symmetric key, rather than to protect traffic / applicative data (symmetric encryption does it well); so cases where unpadded / textbook rsa encryption may be considered (as with RSASVE) appear not so rare and are not an exception.
Mar
22
accepted Is RSA encryption without padding secure with NIST Key Establishment schemes?
Mar
22
comment Is RSA encryption without padding secure with NIST Key Establishment schemes?
@sejpm : for key agreement KAS-1 and KAS 2 schemes use RSASVE and so RSAEP algorithm for shared secret element encryption ; for Key Transport KTS-KEM-KWS uses as well RSASVE and so RSAEP algorithm for shared secret Z encryption
Mar
22
asked Is RSA encryption without padding secure with NIST Key Establishment schemes?
Feb
9
awarded  Popular Question
Jan
4
accepted Does rsa-oaep provide or not plaintext integrity in addition to confidentiality?
Jan
3
comment Does rsa-oaep provide or not plaintext integrity in addition to confidentiality?
@Ricky Demer : thks I understand your answer, as anyone can encrypt anything using public key, there is no valid reference to insure plaintext integrity following decryption- I have been a little bit confused by following EMC/RSA [document ](lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-xmlsec/2009May/att-0032/…) which claims integrity with rsa-oaep in page 5. May integrity have another meaning in that case ?
Jan
3
awarded  Yearling
Jan
2
asked Does rsa-oaep provide or not plaintext integrity in addition to confidentiality?
Aug
30
accepted TLS Handshake : Server authentication or only Server ‘s Certificate authentication?
Aug
30
comment TLS Handshake : Server authentication or only Server ‘s Certificate authentication?
sejpm - Thanks it is more clear now for TLS handshake when considering in reality a combined authentication & key exchange operation which is closed by FINISHED message, rather than (as seen is some articles) considering a standalone authentication step followed by standalone key exchange step which confused me in case of RSA key exchange.
Aug
29
revised TLS Handshake : Server authentication or only Server ‘s Certificate authentication?
deleted 7 characters in body
Aug
29
revised TLS Handshake : Server authentication or only Server ‘s Certificate authentication?
added 35 characters in body
Aug
29
comment TLS Handshake : Server authentication or only Server ‘s Certificate authentication?
sejpm - thanks for precision - yes you're fully right with using DHE . ECDHE as Client receives messages signed by Server's private key. So effectively my post & question concerned specifically case of RSA key exchange.
Aug
29
asked TLS Handshake : Server authentication or only Server ‘s Certificate authentication?
Apr
14
comment Rationale of “r” AES key use in OTR version 3 AKE protocol?
To SOJPM - Clear; I didn't see or note such kind of DH protection on previous protocols (as TLS or IKE) but it makes full sense.
Apr
14
accepted Rationale of “r” AES key use in OTR version 3 AKE protocol?
Apr
13
asked Rationale of “r” AES key use in OTR version 3 AKE protocol?
Dec
6
accepted Will X9.31 remain a secure & acceptable deterministic random generator beyond 2015?
Dec
5
comment Will X9.31 remain a secure & acceptable deterministic random generator beyond 2015?
Ok clear. I will check more in detail Botan documentation and internal prng operation. I just add for info that in my application criticity of key generator makes that it might be implemented on a standalone Linux computer. So no more network access but inversely low activity and so low entropy available within the kernel through /dev/random device and to be compensated by a companion hardware entropy source as Intel drng for instance.