Jeff Burdges

252 reputation

bio	website
	location	http://www.maths.manchester.ac.uk/~burdges/
	age	37
visits	member for	1 year, 8 months
	seen	Mar 27 at 11:49
stats	profile views	5

	252 reputation	bio	website		visits	member for	1 year, 8 months
16 badges		location	http://www.maths.manchester.ac.uk/~burdges/		seen	Mar 27 at 11:49

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Sep 12	awarded	Yearling
Jan 17	comment	Information leakage from the ecryptfs filesystem Is the only big difference between eCryptFS and EncFS that EncFS is userspace with all that entails, and requires users reserve another directory elsewhere for the encrypted files?
Dec 24	comment	How does one design a traffic analysis resistant protocol? Agreed, making the server useless was the whole point talking about "mailboxes". I think what I'd be most interested in is any rigorous analysis of what makes a server useless for traffic analysis while still making ordinary usage reasonable.
Dec 23	revised	How does one design a traffic analysis resistant protocol? added 173 characters in body
Dec 23	comment	How does one design a traffic analysis resistant protocol? I'd consider that "traffic analysis" refers to any attempt to discern the traffic pattern, but especially contacts/friends lists. I suppose one should view this on-server traffic analysis as a completely separate problem form internet traffic analysis.
Dec 23	awarded	Editor
Dec 23	revised	How does one design a traffic analysis resistant protocol? added 136 characters in body
Dec 23	comment	How does one design a traffic analysis resistant protocol? I'd implicitly assumed that the IM server cannot be trusted, maybe I should edit the question, but everything you say still applies of course. I suppose you could achieve this extra traffic merely by using Tor hidden services with all nodes configured as Tor relays.
Dec 23	asked	How does one design a traffic analysis resistant protocol?
Dec 21	accepted	How does the wider cryptographic community view non-abelian group based cryptography?
Dec 21	accepted	Is there any serious discussion about using blinding intermediaries in digital currency scenarios?
Dec 21	awarded	Scholar
Dec 21	accepted	How close is homomorphic encryption to handling regular expressions?
Dec 21	comment	How close is homomorphic encryption to handling regular expressions? Is homomorphic encryption even the correct term when we aren't talking about the ring structure? It'll work, I suppose.
Dec 21	asked	How close is homomorphic encryption to handling regular expressions?
Dec 3	comment	How do we find the last two correspondences in an otherwise known even permutation? You could achieve sublinear space by modifying this algorithm to implement the set as a Bloom filters for the done array, but you must watch that the false positive rate doesn't grow too much, i.e. cycles cannot be too long. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bloom_filter
Dec 3	comment	Could one prevent double spending in decentralized digital currencies (like Bitcoin) without all transactions being public? Agreed, digital currency theory should remain inside crypto.SE.
Dec 2	awarded	Commentator
Dec 2	comment	How do we find the last two correspondences in an otherwise known even permutation? Yes, you must choose the queries, obviously. Just fyi, online algorithm is the technical term for an algorithm that acts on data arriving in a fixed sequence without any chance for going backwards.
Dec 2	comment	How do we find the last two correspondences in an otherwise known even permutation? Create an object Pmod with two variables a and b such that Pmod(a) = n-1, Pmod(b) = n-2, and Pmod(j) = P(j) otherwise. For i=0..n-3, if done[i]==0 then : Initialize j=i. Loop setting done[j]=1 and j=Pmod(j)$ until done[j]==1. If j==n-1, set a=i. If j==n-2, set b=i. You compute the answer using the final values of a and b.