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Mar
24
answered Finding the subgroup in isogeny-based cryptography
Mar
24
comment Are there any practical implementation of a homomorphic hashing or signature scheme?
Appears these system frequently depend upon the hardness of discrete log. I'd be interested in seeing a post-quantum homomorphic hash.
Feb
24
comment Universal reencryption for signatures
An interactive signing process is fine since actually blind signatures are preferable. It's not quite as bad to violate the cross origin policy between the signing authority and the verifiers as it would be to violate it between multiple verifiers. An interactive verification process sounds more problematic.
Feb
24
comment Universal reencryption for signatures
Oops. I've clarified the question. now
Feb
24
revised Universal reencryption for signatures
added 117 characters in body
Feb
24
asked Universal reencryption for signatures
Feb
15
comment How does the wider cryptographic community view non-abelian group based cryptography?
crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/18680/…
Oct
25
accepted Symmetric-like cyphers with several steps
Oct
23
comment Symmetric-like cyphers with several steps
I'm asking for a cypher with an algebraic property of the key material that allows the keys to be split into multiple parts to be used separately. There are several ways to do with with elliptic curves, but one needs something with symmetric-like speed and security, ideally including immunity to quantum computers.
Oct
23
comment Symmetric-like cyphers with several steps
Any cypher I know has the property that identical key material must be used both for encryption and decryption, meaning $k_i$ is a substring of $k_j$ for some $i \ne j$. At a consequence, any system using onion encryption has at most one "cut-out" node : en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cut-out_%28espionage%29
Oct
23
asked Symmetric-like cyphers with several steps
Oct
13
comment Using a product of a series of curve25519 scalars as a private key
Alright, I suppose that answers everything then. In particular, one should not subtract curve25519 scalars because doing so would wipe out the most significant bit. And multiplication might get tricky too. Although one could protect against this by checking that the implementation does not fuck up and start with the most significant bit.
Oct
13
answered Are there any secure commutative ciphers?
Oct
13
awarded  Curious
Oct
12
revised Using a product of a series of curve25519 scalars as a private key
edited title
Oct
12
comment Why are the lower 3 bits of curve25519/ed25519 secret keys cleared during creation?
Ahh, thanks for the explanation. I just asked a slightly expanded version of this question here : crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/29791/…
Oct
12
revised Using a product of a series of curve25519 scalars as a private key
added 791 characters in body
Oct
12
asked Using a product of a series of curve25519 scalars as a private key
Jun
23
awarded  Caucus
Apr
8
awarded  Critic