77 reputation
210
bio website notyet;)
location Peacedale, RI
age
visits member for 2 years, 11 months
seen May 2 at 0:07

Electronics Engineer, Amateur Cryptographer with interests in designing real random and psuedorandom bit generators.

"Randomness is like a box of chocolates; you never know what you are going to get"

                                                                   Forrest Gump Jr.

"You can't use mathematical means to create true randomness but you can use mathematical means to stretch a short truly random bitstream into a binary string of virtually infinite length that is indistinguishable from the uniform distribution, the distinguisher being a Universal Turing Machine". John Von Neumann Jr.

"It's trivial to make a Turing machine that fools all other Turing machines into "thinking" that they are looking at an unpredictable uniform distribution. Here is the schematic."

                                                                   Alan Turing Jr.

May
1
comment Should I trust CipherCloud?
Why was this closed, it has fifteen upvotes so I guess it has sparked reasonable interest. Doesn't seem to be any worse than some of the other questions posted on this site(mine included);-)
Mar
2
answered Why do we assume un-security of communication channel on every cryptography system
Feb
19
comment Are asymptotic lower bounds relevant to cryptography?
@JoeZeng: Thanks Joe, we are being kicked out now but thanks for the nice discussion :-)
Feb
19
comment Are asymptotic lower bounds relevant to cryptography?
@JoeZeng: Joe, I think you might be confused: The strength of the one time pad comes from the randomness of the KEY, not from the "function", the function is just XOR ( or XNOR if you happen to be a natural contrarian) that mixes the plaintext with the key. The key is not the function.
Feb
19
comment Are asymptotic lower bounds relevant to cryptography?
@JoeZeng: The one time pad is a one way permutation: you are using a random key and an XOR gate to perform a permutation on the plaintext. A one way permutation is a kind of one way function, read the article in Wiki for one way functions. Also read the paper by Terry Ritter " The Efficient Generation of Cryptographic Confusion Sequences". Go to section 5.1 One Way Functions and see his quote about ALL strong cryptographic systems are essentially one way functions.
Feb
19
comment Are asymptotic lower bounds relevant to cryptography?
@JoeZeng: Hi Joe, ALL "unbreakable" cryptosystems are by definition one way functions. Its an open problem in theoretical computer science as to the relationship between one way functions and the P vs NP problem.. If you can prove that the one time pad cryptosystem has nothing to do with hard on average problems in NP, step up and write a paper on it and wait for the announcement of your Turing award.
Jan
29
comment What is the most paranoid way to exchange messages?
@JeremyDicaire: Why sad? Maybe they can fall in love, give up cryptography, have a child(Eve?), live happily ever after?(not necessarily in this that order) :-)
Jan
28
comment What is the most paranoid way to exchange messages?
Taking your question at face value, obviously the most paranoid way for Alice and Bob to communicate with perfect secrecy is for Bob and Alice to meet somewhere and whisper messages into each others ear.
Dec
4
comment Bent Combining Functions
I meant no disrespect to Mr. Carlet, I was suggesting that I have no way to verify that any emails I have received are actually from the real Mr. Carlet. You have misunderstood my comment.
Dec
4
comment Bent Combining Functions
@DW: You are right , I did not define what I meant by a bent sequence , I incorrectly assumed that a bent boolean function like the AND function when used as a combining function for psuedorandom sequences will produce a bent sequence. A novice error to be sure.
Dec
3
comment Bent Combining Functions
I'm not sure how your answer relates to my question. The AND function for two variables is bent according to Claude Carlet(he should know!) so if you use it to combine two m-sequence LFRS"s the output is a nonlinear representation of the input. Looking at the truth table for the AND function we see that three out of four lines of the table resolve to 0. So an attacker does not know if the 0 was caused by inputs {0,0} {0,1} or {1,0}. Of course the output will not be balanced but for my circuit I don't care about balance . Sorry if mis-named this sequence a "bent sequence".
Dec
3
comment Bent Combining Functions
@DW: nice answer but it does matter what I call the sequence if I am writing a paper that will be seen by experts . I want to be technically correct. Maybe there is no name designation for the sequence I described, why don't you invent a name for it, I will cite you in the paper ;-)
Dec
3
awarded  Scholar
Dec
3
accepted Bent Combining Functions
Dec
3
asked Bent Combining Functions
Nov
11
comment Cryptanalysis of Linear Feedback Shift Registers
Thank you, the answer was well worth the wait :-)
Nov
9
comment Cryptanalysis of Linear Feedback Shift Registers
@DW. You are right, I think my original question needs to be upgraded , I'll try to come up with a better question. Thanks.
Nov
8
comment Cryptanalysis of Linear Feedback Shift Registers
@DW: Lets just assume that an attacker can see the complete output of the generator and he knows everything about the generator; the register length, polynomial,ect. All the attacker doesn't know is the seed.
Nov
8
comment Cryptanalysis of Linear Feedback Shift Registers
@ DW : What do you mean by "noisy"observations of the LFSR sequence? In answer to your question as what problem I'm trying to solve: I'm trying to do what all cryptographers are trying to do: design a generator that no algorithm can crack, a one way function ;-)
Nov
8
asked Cryptanalysis of Linear Feedback Shift Registers