huyichen
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 Jul2 awarded Curious Jul15 awarded Popular Question Jan31 awarded Notable Question Sep23 awarded Yearling Sep6 awarded Nice Question May16 awarded Popular Question Dec10 accepted New PRG from old Nov2 comment Protocol for Randomized Oblivious Transfer? Thanks, phocho, so if I do the modification for random OT as following:Alice gets random bits $(S_A, P_A)$ and Bob gets random bits $(S_B, P_B)$ with one condition that is $S_A+S_B=P_A P_B$, how should the protocol be modified to realize OT? I think with that condition $(S_A,P_A)$ and $(S_B,P_B)$ can be mapped into $(z_0,z_1)$ and $(c,z_c)$ one by one, but I couldn't really write the mapping out explicitly. Do you have any idea about that? Nov2 accepted Protocol for Randomized Oblivious Transfer? Nov2 asked Protocol for Randomized Oblivious Transfer? Oct23 accepted Why doesn't preimage resistance imply the second preimage resistance? Oct21 asked Why doesn't preimage resistance imply the second preimage resistance? Oct4 awarded Benefactor Oct4 accepted SIM security for two messages Oct3 comment SIM security for two messages Eve receives notification that a message was sent through the channel (but does not receive a ciphertext). (Here we assume that the messages come from a finite message space. Otherwise, Eve is notified the length of the message as well.) Eve continues to arbitrarily interact with the environment. The environment outputs a bit (whether Eve caused a particular observable effect on the environment). The adversary is said to "succeed" in the experiment if the environment outputs 1. Oct3 comment SIM security for two messages Actually, the ideal world is defined as following: Ideal world experiment: Repeatedly do: The adversary Eve arbitrarily interacts with the environment. The environment sends a message m to Alice. Alice sends the message m to Bob through a secure channel. Oct2 awarded Promoter Oct2 revised SIM security for two messages added 97 characters in body Oct1 accepted Can a computationally unbounded adversary break any public-key encryption scheme? Oct1 awarded Supporter