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| visits | member for | 1 year, 8 months |
| seen | Sep 26 '12 at 5:40 | |
| stats | profile views | 19 |
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Nov 2 |
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Randomized Oblivious Transfer Thanks, phocho, so if I do the modification for random OT as following:Alice gets random bits $(S_A, P_A)$ and Bob gets random bits $(S_B, P_B)$ with one condition that is $S_A+S_B=P_A P_B$, how should the protocol be modified to realize OT? I think with that condition $(S_A,P_A)$ and $(S_B,P_B)$ can be mapped into $(z_0,z_1)$ and $(c,z_c)$ one by one, but I couldn't really write the mapping out explicitly. Do you have any idea about that? |
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Oct 3 |
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SIM security for two messages Eve receives notification that a message was sent through the channel (but does not receive a ciphertext). (Here we assume that the messages come from a finite message space. Otherwise, Eve is notified the length of the message as well.) Eve continues to arbitrarily interact with the environment. The environment outputs a bit (whether Eve caused a particular observable effect on the environment). The adversary is said to "succeed" in the experiment if the environment outputs 1. |
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Oct 3 |
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SIM security for two messages Actually, the ideal world is defined as following: Ideal world experiment: Repeatedly do: The adversary Eve arbitrarily interacts with the environment. The environment sends a message m to Alice. Alice sends the message m to Bob through a secure channel. |
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Sep 27 |
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Why isn't the IND-CCA property inherited when sending redundant ciphertext? I think this is a secret key scheme. |