| bio | website | |
|---|---|---|
| location | Europe | |
| age | ||
| visits | member for | 1 year, 7 months |
| seen | 6 hours ago | |
| stats | profile views | 9 |
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May 15 |
awarded | Organizer |
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May 15 |
revised |
PKCS#11: Which CKK_types are supported by CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2? edited tags |
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May 15 |
answered | PKCS#11: Which CKK_types are supported by CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2? |
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Feb 27 |
comment |
Why are RSA keys encoded with ASN.1 for TLS? There are exploits that target buggy implementations of ASN.1, but not ASN.1 itself. In the same way, there are also exploits for XML implementations, but that does not mean that XML is bad. There could be also exploits for you custom hex encoding, no matter how simple. |
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Jan 9 |
answered | Crypto USB Devices - where is the PIN/Password stored? |
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Nov 10 |
answered | Is there a better mode of operation than CBC? |
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Nov 4 |
comment |
RSA and prime difference I tried to clarify more. |
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Nov 4 |
revised |
RSA and prime difference added 687 characters in body |
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Nov 3 |
comment |
RSA and prime difference DSS does not cover DSA only anymore. It has been extended to include RSA and ECC. Indeed my question may be academic but I find it interesting. To say, what tells me that a 1026-bit $p$ and a 1022-bit $q$ are not actually more secure? |
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Nov 3 |
revised |
RSA and prime difference added 64 characters in body |
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Nov 3 |
asked | RSA and prime difference |
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Sep 28 |
awarded | Yearling |
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Sep 25 |
comment |
How practical are side-channel attacks and how much of a concern are they? Uhm. You link two articles that advocate for more widespread measures against side channel attacks. However, both are authored by a company (now acquired) that sells such measures via patent licensing. Such company is (or was) definitely a serious and respectable one, but to me it does not look like a totally objective point of view. |
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Sep 12 |
revised |
How practical are side-channel attacks and how much of a concern are they? added 42 characters in body |
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Sep 12 |
comment |
How practical are side-channel attacks and how much of a concern are they? I agree the risk should be assessed (with the threat agent possibly being a market competitor) but that does not automatically imply that you will find a good motivation to address side-channel attacks. It's very hard to receive bad publicity out of a breach due to side channels attacks (which are today perceived as sophisticated attacks since they require some knowledge of statistics in most cases) unless the product is very widespread and there is a real brand to defend. |
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Sep 12 |
comment |
How practical are side-channel attacks and how much of a concern are they? @fgrieu I have not used the word "econonomically" but only "rewards". Academic attacks, script kiddies, terrorists and so on don't go after money but they can still be modeled while doing risk analysis. Implementation of countermeasures is expensive, so I don't think they should be implemented "just in case". |
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Sep 12 |
answered | How practical are side-channel attacks and how much of a concern are they? |
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Aug 24 |
answered | Is it OK to use a data-encryption key for key wrapping, too? |
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Aug 16 |
comment |
What is the actual difference between security through obscurity and true encryption? @stephen-harris Side channel attacks on cryptographic systems (which are nowadays a big threat, maybe more than cryptanalysis) are based on a priori knowledge of the cryptographic algorithm. If the algorithm is secret, SCAs become a lot harder (yet not impossible). |
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Aug 14 |
revised |
Common modulus attack on RSA when the 2 public exponents differ by a single bit Summarized what the attack is about in the title |