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| bio | website | entropik.net |
|---|---|---|
| location | Istanbul, Turkey | |
| age | ||
| visits | member for | 1 year, 10 months |
| seen | Apr 27 at 21:39 | |
| stats | profile views | 7 |
Solaris, FreeBSD, GNU/Linux and Windows Server system admin. PostgreSQL DBD. PostgreSQL, Oracle and MSSQL DBA. Python, Silverlight and WPF C# developer.
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Jul 13 |
revised |
Taking advantage of one-time pad key reuse? added 69 characters in body |
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Jul 13 |
comment |
Should DES be avoided when developing new systems? Correct me if I'm wrong, but I thought 3DES wasn't a "kind of" DES, but it was a separate algorithm called TDEA which implemented DES in itself. Which, if true, renders DES "easily broken", but not TDEA of course. |
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Jul 13 |
suggested | suggested edit on What are the details of the DES weakness of reusing the same IV in CBC mode with the same key? |
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Jul 13 |
revised |
Taking advantage of one-time pad key reuse? added 375 characters in body |
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Jul 13 |
answered | Taking advantage of one-time pad key reuse? |
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Jul 13 |
revised |
Should DES be avoided when developing new systems? fixed grammar |
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Jul 13 |
suggested | suggested edit on Should DES be avoided when developing new systems? |
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Jul 12 |
revised |
How do I apply differential cryptanalysis to a block cipher? edited tags |
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Jul 12 |
revised |
How do I apply differential cryptanalysis to a block cipher? added 4 characters in body |
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Jul 12 |
answered | How do I apply differential cryptanalysis to a block cipher? |
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Jul 12 |
awarded | Organizer |
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Jul 12 |
revised |
What are the main weaknesses, if any, of a Playfair cipher? edited tags |
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Jul 12 |
awarded | Editor |
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Jul 12 |
revised |
What are the main weaknesses, if any, of a Playfair cipher? edited body |
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Jul 12 |
awarded | Critic |
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Jul 12 |
comment |
Necessity of Randomness of Salts? My point is, if the attacker has user ID's, and the cyphertexts, salt value makes it harder for the attacker to use differential cryptanalysis. In this case, using a global salt is (at least in theory) not any safer than using any salt at all, since the attacker will have access to a lot of user data to work with. Combining a global salt with user ID will make it impossible to see if two passwords are same just by looking at the cyphertext with plain eye, but it won't help against cryptanalysis at all. |
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Jul 12 |
awarded | Teacher |
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Jul 12 |
awarded | Supporter |
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Jul 12 |
comment |
Necessity of Randomness of Salts? Paŭlo, if there's a global salt, then any two users using the same password will eventually have the very same cyphertext in the database. And even if you combine that salt with user ID's, an attacker will have quite a higher chance of retreiving the key with combining all the passwords with all the user ID's. Using a global salt value means XOR'ing the passwords with the very same salt value, and given the attacker has knowledge about the user ID's too (which themselves each act as a second, transparent salt here), it kind of goes pointless to use such a value at all. |
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Jul 12 |
answered | What are the main weaknesses, if any, of a Playfair cipher? |
