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1d
comment What is base of $log$ in Subexponential Algo for DLP?
Oh, yeah. ​ ​ ​
1d
comment What is base of $log$ in Subexponential Algo for DLP?
@mikeazo : ​ It does matter here, since these logs are in the exponent. ​ ​ ​ ​
1d
comment What is base of $log$ in Subexponential Algo for DLP?
It's definitely not base 10. ​ The question should've been whether they're base e or 2. ​ ​ ​ ​
Feb
9
comment What kind of obfuscation is used in this image?
I'm pretty sure requests whose answers would involve "analyzing or deciphering a block of data are" also "off-topic here, as the results are rarely useful to anyone else." ​ ​
Feb
9
comment How is a message digest decrypted?
See these two questions. ​ ​
Feb
7
comment How to find roots of equation $f(x)=0 \pmod p $, where $p$ is prime number?
@poncho : ​ It's analogous to how "the roots might be in" $\mathbb{C}$ even if the coefficients are all in $\mathbb{R}$. ​ ​ ​ ​
Feb
7
comment Why does a non-prime DH modulus creates a “NOBUS” backdoor
"do-able in" ​ -> ​ "do-able in groups of order" ​ ​ ​ ? ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​
Feb
6
comment Common Modulus Attack not reproducible
@fgrieu : ​ Yes, and that can be done with gcd and CRT. ​ ​ ​ ​
Feb
6
comment How to break Universal Re-Encryption algorithm?
Can one "use the homomorphic property of ElGamal for re-encryption without" the group? ​ If no, then it seems like getting Universal re-encryption this way wold require the existence of a Bellagio algorithm to generate the group. ​ ​ ​ ​
Feb
6
comment How to prove that a function F isn't a pseudo random function
Should there be ′s 4 characters after a and b? ​ ​
Feb
6
comment Common Modulus Attack not reproducible
I just checked, it does work. ​ The meadow inverse of 296 is 962. ​ ​ ​ ​
Feb
6
comment Common Modulus Attack not reproducible
I haven't checked this, but think it's not actually necessary. ​ One could instead try using meadow inverses. ​ ​ ​ ​
Feb
6
comment Common Modulus Attack not reproducible
You're not noticing that m is not coprime to n. ​ (Encryption followed by decryption still gives the original input, but such an m [that's also not a multiple of n] gives a non-trivial factorization of n, and the ciphertext will have the same property.) ​ ​ ​ ​
Feb
5
comment Can OTP be made practical by using stretched hash algorithms?
"not with regards to secrecy" against eavesdroppers. ​ It would make a huge difference against chosen-ciphertext attacks. ​ ​ ​ ​
Feb
5
comment Can OTP be made practical by using stretched hash algorithms?
A MAC would be a very sensible "added layer of security" for an OTP. ​ ​
Feb
5
comment Can OTP be made practical by using stretched hash algorithms?
No. ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​
Feb
5
comment How to generate a random number so server cannot cheat?
cse.psu.edu/~ads22/pubs/PS-CSAIL/logmpc-EC-2003.ppt.pdf ​ ​
Feb
4
comment Secure randomized data matching?
A further "way to address this is to" read the link in my comment to the question. ​ ​
Feb
4
comment Find the minimum Adversary's Advantage
What is "(S,V)MAC"? ​ ​
Feb
4
comment Compare two hashes with different salt
(I'm coming back to this question since I was reminded about it when a quite similar question was asked.) ​ For your proposed solution, modular multiplication by $g_2^{-S}$ removes S. ​ ​ ​ ​