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May
6
comment PRG existance and P versus NP
Well, this is the sledge-hammer proof. $\:$ One could just use a SAT algorithm to break the security of any candidate PRG. $\;\;\;\;$
May
6
comment RSA Proof - Is Z(n) closed under multiplication
"this element is not invertible", but that does not necessarily stop the set from being closed under multiplication. $\;$
May
6
comment Bit strength of combining hash functions?
"I want to know the combined bit strength" for what security property? $\;$
May
6
comment Bit strength of combining hash functions?
... for what security property? $\;$
May
6
comment Is G is a secure PRG?
G(x xor 1^s) = F(k,x xor 1^s) xor F(k,x xor 1^s xor 1^s) = F(k,x xor 1^s) xor F(k,x xor 0^s) = F(k,x xor 1^s) xor F(k,x) = F(k,x) xor F(k,x xor 1^s) = G(x)
May
5
revised Is there a flaw in this ECC blind signature scheme?
fixed typo and changed spacing
May
5
comment Proving the possession of signature in zero-knowledge
One could do this with BLS signatures. $\:$ One could even use that to show possession of signatures for at least $m$ out of a list of $n$ messages. $\;\;\;\;$
May
4
comment How do I produce a stream of secure random numbers from AES-Counter mode?
Also, if the generator can either provide bits at its own rate (rather than on demand) or keep an extra 7 bits of state, then one can count output in blocks instead of bits. $\;$
May
4
comment How do I produce a stream of secure random numbers from AES-Counter mode?
@Seth : $\;\;\;$ It doesn't become worthless there, since the output is still indistinguishable from a distribution for which each given value's probability is at most a not-too-large multiple of that value's probability under the uniform distribution. $\:$ In particular, if an adversary has a negligible probability of success on truly random bits, then its probability of success on CTR output should also be negligible. $\hspace{.91 in}$
May
3
comment Generating the keys for the RSA cryptosystem in probabilistic polynomial time
"=" $\mapsto$ "$\approx$" $\;$
May
2
comment Generating the keys for the RSA cryptosystem in probabilistic polynomial time
jstor.org/stable/2371291 $\;$
Apr
30
comment Why must IV be sent with each packet?
The IV needs to change in the lifetime of one session so that an eavesdropper can't determine whether or not a plaintext was repeated. $\;$
Apr
30
comment Why must IV be sent with each packet?
You don't need to send "the IV" more than once. $\:$ On the other hand, you need to send and MAC each IV. $\;\;\;\;$
Apr
30
reviewed Leave Closed Is less security required for a short stream cipher than for the AES enciphering of very long messages?
Apr
28
comment Simplified Key Wrapping to Achieve Only Confidentiality?
Yes, although I noticed that I can cut down on the number of lines, so I removed two of them. $\hspace{.77 in}$
Apr
28
revised Simplified Key Wrapping to Achieve Only Confidentiality?
reduced number of line-breaks
Apr
28
comment Simplified Key Wrapping to Achieve Only Confidentiality?
I do not mean guessing W'. $\:$ See my updated answer. $\;\;\;\;$
Apr
28
revised Simplified Key Wrapping to Achieve Only Confidentiality?
addressed OP's comment
Apr
27
answered Simplified Key Wrapping to Achieve Only Confidentiality?
Apr
24
revised Why does knowing the number of points on a curve help solve ECCDLP?
improved grammar