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Jun
12
comment Compact digital signature for noisy data
You could only use an ECC that includes the original message in its codewords, since your setting specifies that M must be transmitted anyway. $\:$ Including sketch's_helper_data(M) in the traditional signature's input would preserve any strong unforgeability of the traditional signature scheme, insofar as that is possible in your setting. $\;\;\;\;$
Jun
12
comment Compact digital signature for noisy data
More generally, one can say that the "trivial" schemes are those in which $S$ consists of a standard signature and (possibly empty) data that together with any data recovered from the signature (which will be empty unless that scheme is with-recovery) is sufficient to recover $M$ from a noisy version of $M$, such as a not-necessarily-secure sketch. $\;$
Jun
11
revised Compact digital signature for noisy data
improved phrasing and fixed a grammar error and changed spacing
Jun
11
comment Given $n$ bits, how many “truly random” sequences/numbers can be constructed?
You might be interested in Kolmogorov complexity. $\;$
Jun
11
revised Given $n$ bits, how many “truly random” sequences/numbers can be constructed?
fixed typo, improved grammar, and changed spacing
Jun
10
revised Is ”generating transcripts that are indistinguishable from actual messages in a signature scheme” not universal forgery?
inserted link and changed spacing
Jun
9
revised How can one detect if a hash function doesn't have a full image?
fixed title's grammar and changed body's spacing
Jun
9
revised Elliptic Curve based blind signature implementation
improved grammar and changed spacing
Jun
7
comment Security of a security protocol for key exchange, using symmetric-key cryptography
@fgrieu : $\;\;\;$ Who generated $k_1$? $\:$ Who generated $k_2$? $\;\;\;\;\;\;\;$
Jun
7
revised Obfuscate an “I'll reveal if you do” function
mentioned Naor
Jun
7
comment Obfuscate an “I'll reveal if you do” function
Also, your suggestion does not satisfy "the source code ... Alice's secret", since Alice could tell Carol $s(w||q)$, so that Carol doesn't know Alice's secret but seeing $P$ would reveal Bob's secret to Carol. $\hspace{.53 in}$
Jun
7
comment Obfuscate an “I'll reveal if you do” function
What makes the obfuscation task hard is that your formalization rules out Naor commitment; I have no idea how important non-interactivity is or isn't for your motivation. $\;$
Jun
6
answered Obfuscate an “I'll reveal if you do” function
Jun
6
comment Multiplication-homomorphic schemes
You could get an upper boundary on decryption time. $\;$
Jun
6
comment Hamiltonicity proof of knowledge
1. I didn't; I used the fact that $\kappa(|x|)$ is non-negative. $\:$ 2. I probably don't; I put that in to help with $K$'s efficiency. $\:$ 3. My just-elaborated-on proof shows otherwise. $\:$ 4. My conclusion stems from the fact that my proof of validity doesn't use anything at all about the protocol. $\;\;\;\;$
Jun
6
revised Hamiltonicity proof of knowledge
elaborated on proof
Jun
6
comment RSA encryption and signature padding flaw
Do Alice and Bob use the same modulus? $\;$
Jun
5
comment Pick faster private exponent
Are you already using CRT decryption? $\;$
Jun
5
comment server aid secure equality test
Do $P_1$ and $P_2$ each have a way to authenticate messages forwarded from the other one of them? $\hspace{.6 in}$
Jun
5
comment server aid secure equality test
Is the server semi-trusted? $\:$ (in the sense described here) $\;\;\;\;$