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Sep
4
revised Privacy-Preserving relational databases: checking the existence of a record (or multiple records)
fixed math error
Sep
4
comment Which public key encryption scheme is re-randomizable? How can I re-randomize an encryption scheme?
eprint.iacr.org/2007/119.pdf $\;$
Sep
4
comment Privacy-Preserving relational databases: checking the existence of a record (or multiple records)
Should responses to "queries containing a list of record ids" indicate how many ids are present, or which? $\;$
Sep
4
answered Privacy-Preserving relational databases: checking the existence of a record (or multiple records)
Sep
3
comment Privacy-Preserving relational databases: checking the existence of a record (or multiple records)
The communication complexity doesn't depend on the number of elements, except perhaps for list-queries if you allow a(n exponentially) small probability of the user outputting failure without the server being able to determine on its own whether or not that will happen. $\:$ The same applies when "communication complexity" is replaced with "client's computation". $\:$ I'm going to bed, and will write up an answer tomorrow. $\;\;\;\;$
Sep
3
comment Privacy-Preserving relational databases: checking the existence of a record (or multiple records)
In that case, you can use the paper I linked to. $\;$
Sep
2
comment Privacy-Preserving relational databases: checking the existence of a record (or multiple records)
Will there be well over 1000 ids? $\;$
Sep
2
comment Privacy-Preserving relational databases: checking the existence of a record (or multiple records)
How long are the ids? $\:$ See this paper. $\;\;\;\;$
Aug
30
comment Asymmetric algorithm for one time signing of small cleartext
An attacker could do that, but it shouldn't be accepted as a revocation of any pair $\langle m',p\rangle$. $\hspace{.86 in}$
Aug
30
comment Asymmetric algorithm for one time signing of small cleartext
Whenever the system receives a message $m$ as input, the system lets $x$ be a uniformly-random bit-string of the right length and publishes $\langle m\hspace{.02 in},f(x)\rangle$. $\;$
Aug
30
comment Asymmetric algorithm for one time signing of small cleartext
... um, it wouldn't mean that. $\;$
Aug
30
comment Asymmetric algorithm for one time signing of small cleartext
@fread2281 : $\:$ You can just treat each message independently "to avoid that forgery." $\hspace{1.16 in}$
Aug
30
comment Asymmetric algorithm for one time signing of small cleartext
@QuadrExAtt : $\:$ everone $\mapsto$ everyone $\;\;\;\;$
Aug
30
comment Asymmetric algorithm for one time signing of small cleartext
Why can't they just bundle f(x) with the data for some one-way function f? $\;$
Aug
30
comment Asymmetric algorithm for one time signing of small cleartext
One thing he might mean by better security is hopefully being secure against quantum algorithms. $\hspace{.43 in}$
Aug
30
comment Asymmetric algorithm for one time signing of small cleartext
How was RSA "proved to be as difficult as prime factorisation"? $\;$
Aug
29
revised practically verifying block ciphers strength
general copy-editing
Aug
27
comment Possible CPA or CCA attack when using AES-CBC mode under the following situation?
imaging $\mapsto$ imagine $\;$
Aug
24
comment Groth-Sahai proofs and hardness assumptions
site.uottawa.ca/~lucia/courses/4105-10/CIRCUITSATisNPhard.pdf $\;$
Aug
24
comment Groth-Sahai proofs and hardness assumptions
Real executions use Binding keys and the Simulator uses Hiding keys. $\;$