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Aug
24
answered OTP same message encrypted twice (with different keys)
Aug
24
comment Why an upside down path on the evaluation of branching program on encrypted data?
Yes. ${}{}{}\;$
Aug
24
comment Why an upside down path on the evaluation of branching program on encrypted data?
We "can obtain $P(x)$ from a path from the terminal nodes to the initial node" because the value of every non-terminal node is defined in terms of (stuff that's independent of $P$ and) the values of nodes that are closer to being terminal. $\:$ With their approach, those values will already have been computed by the time they are to be used, rather than having to be computed on-the-fly. $\;\;\;\;$
Aug
24
comment Why an upside down path on the evaluation of branching program on encrypted data?
I now realize that memoization is actually independent of the point I was trying to make. $\;$
Aug
24
revised Why an upside down path on the evaluation of branching program on encrypted data?
corrected explanation from memoization to recursion
Aug
24
revised Why an upside down path on the evaluation of branching program on encrypted data?
addressed the PS
Aug
24
answered Why an upside down path on the evaluation of branching program on encrypted data?
Aug
24
comment Are there any encryption schemes that enable to permute homomorphically?
I don't have any hints about that, but their hint about that forms section 3.1, which starts on page 7. $\hspace{.4 in}$
Aug
24
revised Are there any encryption schemes that enable to permute homomorphically?
corrected an error
Aug
24
answered Are there any encryption schemes that enable to permute homomorphically?
Aug
20
comment Combining several symmetric ciphers using XOR
crypto.stackexchange.com/q/25733/991 $\;$
Aug
20
comment Is full Homomorphic encryption quantum resistant?
@ChrisPeikert : $\:$ (I realize the paper does say that, but figure I should mention that) I thought all candidate schemes for depth beyond [c*log(n) for a constant c determined during key generation] are "guaranteed to run correctly for" arbitrarily "many evaluations of the group operation". $\;\;\;\;$
Aug
19
comment How does the small n attack work?
Oh, I didn't notice that the description had a -1 instead of a +1. $\:$ In that case, one should consider the effect of Trudy sending back 1 as n. $\;\;\;\;$
Aug
19
comment How does the small n attack work?
To start with, suppose Trudy sends back zero as n. ​ ​
Aug
16
comment Mathematically / statistically “safe” way to differentiate between crypto and random blob?
@Christian : $\:$ No; there is no feasible-length string of zeros that $\hspace{2.37 in}$ "opens the way for you to use encryption later." $\;\;\;\;$
Aug
14
comment Are there simpler FHE methods than Craig Gentry's original paper?
people.csail.mit.edu/vinodv/6892-Fall2013/BGV.pdf $\;$
Aug
12
comment IND-CCA1 RSA padding?
crypto.stackexchange.com/a/312/991 $\;$
Aug
12
comment IND-CCA1 RSA padding?
Can you use the ECDH unit for elGamal? $\;$
Aug
10
comment Factors of the group order to secure against Pohlig-Hellman
It looks like "no" should be replaced with "yes". $\:$ (See the "not" in the question you quoted.) $\hspace{.92 in}$
Aug
10
comment Is it possible to validate a Public Key in RSA?
On the other hand, a large-enough prime $e$ allows one to verify in polynomial time that the core public operation is a permutation. $\;$