Reputation
4,765
Next tag badge:
50/100 score
29/20 answers
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Newest
 Yearling
Impact
~45k people reached

Dec
30
comment Possible to know who is the owner of a message encrypted with RSA public key
"I sign this" $\: \mapsto \:$ "I encrypt these" $\;\;\;$ ? $\;\;\;\;\;\;\;$
Dec
29
comment Possible to know who is the owner of a message encrypted with RSA public key
How do you "sign this messages with their public keys"? $\:$ Do you also have their private keys? $\hspace{.74 in}$
Dec
29
comment Is there a way to “shorten” a Merkle chain?
What is "a Merkle chain of 3 items"? $\;$
Dec
23
comment Obliviously computing the Least common multiple of two poylnomials
What ring are those polynomials over? $\;$
Dec
23
reviewed Edit PBKDF vs HKDF for pretty long key
Dec
23
revised PBKDF vs HKDF for pretty long key
corrected grammar
Dec
22
comment Which gives better deterministic encryption SIV or Plain ECB mode?
@pg1989 : $\:$ No; SIV also provides authentication. $\;\;\;\;$
Dec
22
comment Find private exponent in RSA
@Robert : $\;\;\;$ "Euler totient $\phi(n)$" $\: \mapsto \:$ "Carmichael function $\lambda(n)$" $\;\;\;\;\;\;\;$
Dec
21
revised Post-quantum hybrid encryption
put in missing word
Dec
21
answered Post-quantum hybrid encryption
Dec
20
revised Are there signatures that don't have subliminal channels?
fixed a hole
Dec
20
comment Are there signatures that don't have subliminal channels?
That's a ... fairly general definition of "a de randomization scheme". $\:$ The verifier can "be sure it was used" by putting the signature "through the modular exponentiation which is at the core of RSA", and checking whether or not the output is equal to what the first three steps produce. $\;\;\;\;$
Dec
20
answered Are there signatures that don't have subliminal channels?
Dec
18
comment Attacker in a key exchange
@Bimal : $\:$ What do A and B output as their keys? $\;\;\;\;$
Dec
18
comment Attacker in a key exchange
@GuutBoy : $\;\;\;$ The arrows mean sends to. $\:$ X(A) means the adversary while pretending to be A. $\hspace{.58 in}$
Dec
16
comment Extending pseudorandom generator by one bit using exclusive-or of previous bits
Alternatively, $\;\;\;$ "$z$'s first $m$ bits" $\: \mapsto \:$ "$z$" $\;\;$ and $\;\;$ "the last bit of $z$" $\: \mapsto \:$ "$0$" $\;\;$. $\;\;\;\;\;\;\;$
Dec
13
comment Is it safe to AES-CBC and AES-CMAC both using the same key?
Having said that, I'm now wondering if maybe your approach is more secure than the usual one. $\hspace{.6 in}$
Dec
13
comment Is it safe to AES-CBC and AES-CMAC both using the same key?
... Just concatenate the IV with the rest of the ciphertext. $\;$
Dec
12
comment Is it safe to AES-CBC and AES-CMAC both using the same key?
Why does IV go into the plaintext? $\;$
Dec
12
comment PRG variant as a commitment scheme
(... continued) $\:$ there are no trusted parties and no trusted strings, the parties are limited to sending bits and qubits to each other (as opposed to, for example, sending tamper-evident seals or physical uncloneable functions or other hardware), and clocks are inaccurate (generally, they can only be used to detect that absence of an expected message). $\;\;\;\;$