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| bio | website | google.com |
|---|---|---|
| location | ||
| age | ||
| visits | member for | 1 year, 8 months |
| seen | 9 hours ago | |
| stats | profile views | 23 |
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May 30 |
comment |
The security of the AES secret itself (I don't see what this has to do with transparent encryption.) $\;$ |
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May 30 |
answered | HMAC collision probability bounds |
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May 30 |
comment |
HMAC collision probability bounds Can m2 depend on HMAC(k,m1) in a way that is infeasible to compute? $\;$ |
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May 30 |
comment |
With HMAC, can an attacker recover the key, given many known plaintext/tag pairs? No, since HMAC is believed to be secure. $\;$ |
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May 28 |
comment |
Encrypt user email but be able to find user by email While you say "find user by email", it seems like you're describing finding emails by username. $\hspace{.12 in}$ |
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May 28 |
comment |
Size of Parameters in Polynomial Key-Splitting Algorithm Yes, because that allows one to select an element uniformly. $\:$ |
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May 28 |
comment |
Size of Parameters in Polynomial Key-Splitting Algorithm No, it just needs to be done in a finite field (as jug stated). $\:$ |
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May 25 |
comment |
Key sizes for discrete logarithm based methods It doesn't. $\;$ |
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May 25 |
revised |
sir,please suggest me an algorithm or method how can i improve the prediction based encryption method using randomization? imporoved spacing, capitalization, and grammar |
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May 25 |
suggested | suggested edit on sir,please suggest me an algorithm or method how can i improve the prediction based encryption method using randomization? |
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May 24 |
comment |
Proper Way to Encrypt Data with Two Keys? symmetric or asymmetric? $\;$ |
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May 23 |
comment |
Requiring a “supervisor” key pair and a “user” key pair to decrypt multiple-recipient messages No, he said he wants Jim to be able to supervise (not designate) who can decrypt, $\hspace{1.4 in}$ without being able to decrypt himself. $\:$ The sensible interpretation of this is that Jim controls $\hspace{1 in}$ who among the people selected by Bob can decrypt. $\;\;$ |
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May 21 |
comment |
Do I need to keep a 64-bit version number secret? If the receiver already knows version, then you can use version as the associated data in SIV mode. |
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May 18 |
revised |
Why this k parameter is in unary in adversary PPT algorithm? fixed my misreading of OP |
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May 18 |
comment |
Why this k parameter is in unary in adversary PPT algorithm? Incidentally, this would probably fit better on cstheory. $\:$ |
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May 18 |
answered | Why this k parameter is in unary in adversary PPT algorithm? |
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May 18 |
comment |
Alternatives to HMAC + CBC? I imagine things would be easier if you moved the HMAC to the end. $\:$ |
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May 17 |
comment |
Is this a sensible cryptographic protocol intending to reduce the impact of compromised security? ... so, your nodes are going to need to read more of that data than they $\hspace{1.96 in}$ have the ability to decrypt with AES? $\:$ |
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May 15 |
comment |
Encrypting a broadcast channel I suppose I would suggest that the subscriber decrypts their section with their personal key to get "comkey", decrypts another pair of sections with "comkey" to get the session key and a decommitment to it, verifies the decommitment (against the commitment included in the broadcast stream), and then decrypts the whole message with the session key. $\:$ There are "verifiable broadcast encryption schemes" which also rule out [some but not all receivers get a decryption error], but I imagine those would be much less efficient. $\;\;$ |
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May 14 |
comment |
Encrypting a broadcast channel Note that the method given in this answer does not offer the receivers any $\hspace{1.43 in}$ assurance that they won't get different messages. $\:$ |
