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4h
comment RSA with probable primes
residuals $\mapsto$ residual $\;$
5h
comment RSA with probable primes
"which a" $\: \mapsto \:$ "which is a" $\;\;\;\;$
5h
comment RSA with probable primes
The "time it takes to reach certainty" depends on the randomness used, but is not heuristic. $\:$ (Bernstein proves that its expected value is at most $O\hspace{-0.04 in}\left(\hspace{-0.03 in}(\log(n))^{4+o(1)}\hspace{-0.02 in}\right)$. $\;\;\;\;$
5h
comment RSA with probable primes
proove $\mapsto$ prove $\;$
5h
comment Executing encrypted code?
boazbarak.org/Papers/obfuscate.pdf $\:$ eprint.iacr.org/2014/942 $\:$ security.stackexchange.com/q/24551/49075 $\;\;\;\;$
7h
comment RSA with probable primes
cr.yp.to/primetests/quartic-20060914-ams.pdf $\;$
10h
comment Product of Sophie Germain Primes and safe primes
What tupling function should be used to calculate the length of a given Cunningham chain? $\hspace{.91 in}$
1d
comment Huffman encoding of hashes
How about a base-256 encoding? $\:$ (aka, not encoded at all) $\;\;\;\;$
1d
comment Huffman encoding of hashes
They can be encoded with just 20 characters. $\;$
1d
comment Huffman encoding of hashes
No, but getting farther away from that requires more output for a given security level. $\hspace{1.41 in}$
1d
comment Authenticated EC key exchange without a signing/signature scheme?
@StevePeltz : $\:$ Yes. $\;\;\;\;$
2d
comment Hard-core predicates: should the adversary be given $1^n$?
$B$ can just run $A$ with $n$ ranging from $0$ to $\:2\hspace{-0.03 in}\cdot \hspace{-0.03 in}\operatorname{length}(\hspace{.03 in}y)\:$,$\:$ since injective functions have negligible probability of shrinking random inputs by large amounts. $\;\;\;\;$
2d
comment Hash length extension attack - SHA256 to 512 - impossible, correct?
Of course, it would probably be better is the user can see a commitment to the secret instead of the SHA256 hash of the secret, and if the user-key is then HMACed with the secret instead of them being hashed with SHA512. $\;$
May
21
comment Would this method deliver a perfectly non-malleable encryption for at least two blocks?
"The second block" of the ciphertext "includes the propagation ... intermediate block". $\:$ "The second block" of the plaintext is not affected by the IV. $\;\;\;\;$
May
21
comment Would this method deliver a perfectly non-malleable encryption for at least two blocks?
The version you have at the moment (you might still be editing) is still malleable because changing $\hspace{.42 in}$ the IV would change block1 of the decryption result but not block2 of the decryption result. $\hspace{.92 in}$
May
21
comment Would this method deliver a perfectly non-malleable encryption for at least two blocks?
Now that I'm actually looking at your decryption procedure, I see that your scheme is very malleable, $\hspace{.13 in}$ since xoring the IV with any string will xor the result of decryption with the same string. $\hspace{1.19 in}$
May
21
comment Would this method deliver a perfectly non-malleable encryption for at least two blocks?
You should also note that if 128 is large, then there is a simple&standard way to do the no-ciphertext-expansion version of what you're trying for, although it's slightly less efficient than your third version. $\;$
May
21
comment Would this method deliver a perfectly non-malleable encryption for at least two blocks?
It looks like your third version requires 4 encryptions per block, 2 with each key. $\;$
May
21
comment prepaid meters that rely on a disconnected system
Why doesn't asymmetric "fit the architecture of one server sending to many clients"? $\hspace{1.29 in}$
May
21
comment prepaid meters that rely on a disconnected system
Why would it "mean they are using a" symmetric algorithm? $\;$