Timeline for Security of using key size larger than the message digest size in HMAC, with one time pads
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
4 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
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| Apr 1, 2023 at 1:40 | history | edited | Paul Uszak | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
Rmoved DoS item as I was wrong.
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| Mar 2, 2023 at 13:14 | comment | added | Paul Uszak | @CuriousCrypto Rethinking, that's a good question. I'm going to put it to the community... | |
| Mar 2, 2023 at 8:45 | comment | added | CuriousCrypto | I didn't get the first part exactly where "By using OTP material for the HMAC key, you create a denial of service (DoS) vulnerability in that an attacker can swamp your input with fake packets that all have to be authenticated draining your key store". Can you elaborate that part a bit further? | |
| Mar 1, 2023 at 14:19 | history | answered | Paul Uszak | CC BY-SA 4.0 |