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This attack requires that r'=ru mod p-1$r' = ru \bmod p-1$ and r'=r mod p$r' = r \bmod p$. If r'$r'$ were less than p-1$p-1$, it would have to be that r'=r=ru$r'=r=ru$ over the integers (no modulus), which is unlikely as u$u$ is computed from two hashed values (and thus, u$u$ is likely not 1$1$). Thus, for this attack to work, r'$r'$ must be larger than p-1$p-1$.

This attack requires that r'=ru mod p-1 and r'=r mod p. If r' were less than p-1, it would have to be that r'=r=ru over the integers (no modulus), which is unlikely as u is computed from two hashed values (and thus, u is likely not 1). Thus, for this attack to work, r' must be larger than p-1.

This attack requires that $r' = ru \bmod p-1$ and $r' = r \bmod p$. If $r'$ were less than $p-1$, it would have to be that $r'=r=ru$ over the integers (no modulus), which is unlikely as $u$ is computed from two hashed values (and thus, $u$ is likely not $1$). Thus, for this attack to work, $r'$ must be larger than $p-1$.

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This attack requires that r'=ru mod p-1 and r'=r mod p. If r' were less than p-1, it would have to be that r'=r=ru over the integers (no modulus), which is unlikely as u is computed from two hashed values (and thus, u is likely not 1). Thus, for this attack to work, r' must be larger than p-1.