Timeline for Paper based OTP and MAC
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
6 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct 2 at 15:44 | comment | added | oaky_0ffc | Also it should be easier to execute a universal hash compared to an cryptographic hash function. | |
| Oct 2 at 15:43 | comment | added | oaky_0ffc | The problem that I'm bringing up is that I presume the goal is information theoretic security. OTP only protects confidentiality and not integrity. As an example, let's say a bank uses OTP to protect bank account transfer messages. These messages are likely in a known format. If I know some part of the message ie for example the destination account number of the transfer, I can bitflip that section to something else(like my account number). OTP provides no protection in this scenario and HMAC will fail to provide information theoretic security in regards to integrity(bruteforcable). | |
| Oct 2 at 11:32 | comment | added | Paul Uszak | Re. 1st para, last sentence. How can you create a sensible false message without knowing the OTP? It won't decrypt to anything meaningful. Breaking the HMAC doesn't break the OPT; that's not just hash collision resistance. | |
| Oct 1 at 16:06 | review | Late answers | |||
| Oct 2 at 6:26 | |||||
| S Oct 1 at 15:46 | review | First answers | |||
| Oct 2 at 6:26 | |||||
| S Oct 1 at 15:46 | history | answered | oaky_0ffc | CC BY-SA 4.0 |