The scenario is like this:

$P_1$ has $m_1$, $P_2$ has $m_2$, they want to compare whether $m_1=m_2$ via the server $S$. After the protocol, only $S$ knows the result, and there is no interaction between $P_1$ and $P_2$.

An example solution:

1. $P_1$ encrypts $m_1$ with his public key $PK_1$; Then he sends $E(PK_1,m_1)$ and $PK_1$ to $S$; ($E$ is additively homomorphic)
2. $S$ forwards $E(PK_1, m_1)$ and $PK_1$ to $P_2$;
3. $P_2$ encrypts $m_2$ with $PK_1$, and calculates $E(PK_1,m_0) = E(PK_1, m_2-m_1) = E(PK_1,m_2) - E(PK_1,m_1)$; Then he sends $E(PK_1, m_0)$ to $S$;
4. $S$ does an oblivious decryption with $P_1$ to get $m_0$, and checks whether $m_0=0$

But in step 2, a malicious $S$ can sends $E(PK_s, 0)$ and $PK_s$ to $P2$ ($S$ knows the decryption key $SK_s$). Then $S$ will get $E(PK_s, m_2)$ from $P_2$, so that he will get $m_2$.

The scenario is like this:

$P_1$ has $m_1$, $P_2$ has $m_2$, they want to compare whether $m_1=m_2$ via the server $S$. After the protocol, only $S$ knows the result, and there is no interaction between $P_1$ and $P_2$.

An example solution:

1. $P_1$ encrypts $m_1$ with his public key $PK_1$; Then he sends $E(PK_1,m_1)$ and $PK_1$ to $S$; ($E$ is additively homomorphic)
2. $S$ forwards $E(PK_1, m_1)$ and $PK_1$ to $P_2$;
3. $P_2$ encrypts $m_2$ with $PK_1$, and calculates $E(PK_1,m_0) = E(PK_1, m_2-m_1) = E(PK_1,m_2) - E(PK_1,m_1)$; Then he sends $E(PK_1, m_0)$ to $S$;
4. $S$ does an oblivious decryption with $P_1$ to get $m_0$, and checks whether $m_0=0$

But in step 2, a malicious $S$ can sends $E(PK_s, 0)$ and $PK_s$ to $P2$ ($S$ knows the decryption key $SK_s$). Then $S$ will get $E(PK_s, m_2)$ from $P_2$, so that he will get $m_2$.

The scenario is like this:

$P_1$ has $m_1$, $P_2$ has $m_2$, they want to compare whether $m_1=m_2$ via the server $S$. After the protocol, only $S$ knows the result, and there is no interaction between $P_1$ and $P_2$.

An example solution:

1. $P_1$ encrypts $m_1$ with his public key $PK_1$; Then he sends $E(PK_1,m_1)$ and $PK_1$ to $S$; ($E$ is additively homomorphic)
2. $S$ forwards $E(PK_1, m_1)$ and $PK_1$ to $P_2$;
3. $P_2$ encrypts $m_2$ with $PK_1$, and calculates $E(PK_1,m_0) = E(PK_1, m_2-m_1) = E(PK_1,m_2) - E(PK_1,m_1)$; Then he sends $E(PK_1, m_0)$ to $S$;
4. $S$ does an oblicious decryption with $P_1$ to get $m_0$, and checks whether $m_0=0$

But in step 2, a malicious $S$ can sends $E(PK_s, 0)$ and $PK_s$ to $P2$ ($S$ knows the decryption key $SK_s$). Then $S$ will get $E(PK_s, m_2)$ from $P_2$, so that he will get $m_2$.

The scenario is like this:

$P_1$ has $m_1$, $P_2$ has $m_2$, they want to compare whether $m_1=m_2$ via the server $S$. After the protocol, only $S$ knows the result, and there is no interaction between $P_1$ and $P_2$.

An example solution:

1. $P_1$ encrypts $m_1$ with his public key $PK_1$; Then he sends $E(PK_1,m_1)$ and $PK_1$ to $S$; ($E$ is additively homomorphic)
2. $S$ forwards $E(PK_1, m_1)$ and $PK_1$ to $P_2$;
3. $P_2$ encrypts $m_2$ with $PK_1$, and calculates $E(PK_1,m_0) = E(PK_1, m_2-m_1) = E(PK_1,m_2) - E(PK_1,m_1)$; Then he sends $E(PK_1, m_0)$ to $S$;
4. $S$ does an oblivious decryption with $P_1$ to get $m_0$, and checks whether $m_0=0$

But in step 2, a malicious $S$ can sends $E(PK_s, 0)$ and $PK_s$ to $P2$ ($S$ knows the decryption key $SK_s$). Then $S$ will get $E(PK_s, m_2)$ from $P_2$, so that he will get $m_2$.