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Jul 22, 2014 at 3:20 history edited e-sushi CC BY-SA 3.0
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Jul 22, 2014 at 1:58 history edited Antikithira CC BY-SA 3.0
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Jul 21, 2014 at 9:19 history tweeted twitter.com/#!/StackCrypto/status/491150372627836928
Jul 21, 2014 at 7:03 comment added fgrieu In my first comment, read "the adversary able to mount a chosen-PLAINTEXT attack".
Jul 21, 2014 at 6:12 comment added fgrieu @RickyDemer: Yes. Adapted to the present context (with CRC instead of Hash, but that works for a hash just the same): one decides the desired Forgery, computes its CRC, builds 6zeroes||Headers||CRC||Forgery, submits that as (chosen) Data for authentication and encryption; and from the resulting cryptogram removes the first 16 bytes (including 8 bytes IV). What remains will pass verification (the first 8 bytes will be the IV).
Jul 21, 2014 at 5:56 comment added user991 @fgrieu : $\:$ Is there such an attack when the hash goes before the plaintext? $\;\;\;\;$
Jul 21, 2014 at 5:52 answer added user991 timeline score: 3
Jul 21, 2014 at 5:47 comment added fgrieu The terminology is not quite right: CRC32 can't be used as (a weak substitute for) a MAC, for it is a keyless transformation of the message. Rather, here, it is used as (a weak substitute for) a hash in a hash-then-encrypt scheme, something which itself does not generally insure message integrity. $\;$ If the IV for the 3DES-CBC encryption is 8 random bytes prepended to the cryptogram, and the length of Data variable, and the adversary able to mount a chosen-ciphertext attacks, then such generic attacks on hash-then-CBC-encrypt work here.
Jul 21, 2014 at 5:26 review First posts
Jul 21, 2014 at 7:21
Jul 21, 2014 at 5:24 comment added Richie Frame CRC is not a MAC at all, it provides no authentication
Jul 21, 2014 at 5:22 history asked Antikithira CC BY-SA 3.0