Timeline for Reordering non-block-aligned parts with DES in ECB mode
Current License: CC BY-SA 3.0
5 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sep 29, 2015 at 19:18 | review | Late answers | |||
| Sep 29, 2015 at 19:38 | |||||
| Jul 24, 2014 at 5:25 | comment | added | fgrieu♦ | Yes, with the assumption of a known plaintext block common to enough instances of the problem to make a precomputation worthwile, what you are describing is feasible. However that does not apply in the situation of the question: there is no indication of multiple instances, and I see no hope to find an existing rainbow table that applies, for we need a different table for each known plaintext block. | |
| Jul 24, 2014 at 3:53 | comment | added | Antikithira | If you wanted to crack a single message for a single DES key then yes, it wouldn't help. If you could predict a specific plaintext which could be a name or something like that then a rainbow table could be built to help even if the DES key was changing for every message or if you had limited amount of time to attack the message. No? | |
| Jul 23, 2014 at 4:47 | comment | added | fgrieu♦ | A rainbow table to crack DES encryption, really? If you maintain that assertion, give us details!! Absent these, I consider this is a serious confusion. | |
| Jul 23, 2014 at 3:31 | history | answered | Antikithira | CC BY-SA 3.0 |