Skip to main content
Cryptography

Return to Answer

my editor did a good job except it is Boneh not Bineh
Source Link
Jacob E Mack
Jacob E Mack
  • 173
  • 6

Feistel networks were broken in DES but not triple DES. Some final AES candidates not approved also used Feistel networks $2^{36}$ plain text attacks. Reduction of $2^{16}$ possible keys for single DES: $4^{48/6} = 4^{8} = 2^{16}$.

First for a one round Feistel network: $R_0$ and $f (R_O, k_1) = R_1 \oplus L_0$, $k_1$ becomes known.

For two round Fiestel: Use the same method twice: $$(R_0, f(R_0,l_1)=L_2 \oplus L_0) \ (L_2,f(L_2,K_2)= R_2 \oplus R_0)$$

A nice reference would be CryptoLecture 04 (PDF) from Daniel Bineh'sBoneh's crypto course on Coursera.

Feistel networks were broken in DES but not triple DES. Some final AES candidates not approved also used Feistel networks $2^{36}$ plain text attacks. Reduction of $2^{16}$ possible keys for single DES: $4^{48/6} = 4^{8} = 2^{16}$.

First for a one round Feistel network: $R_0$ and $f (R_O, k_1) = R_1 \oplus L_0$, $k_1$ becomes known.

For two round Fiestel: Use the same method twice: $$(R_0, f(R_0,l_1)=L_2 \oplus L_0) \ (L_2,f(L_2,K_2)= R_2 \oplus R_0)$$

A nice reference would be CryptoLecture 04 (PDF) from Daniel Bineh's crypto course on Coursera.

Feistel networks were broken in DES but not triple DES. Some final AES candidates not approved also used Feistel networks $2^{36}$ plain text attacks. Reduction of $2^{16}$ possible keys for single DES: $4^{48/6} = 4^{8} = 2^{16}$.

First for a one round Feistel network: $R_0$ and $f (R_O, k_1) = R_1 \oplus L_0$, $k_1$ becomes known.

For two round Fiestel: Use the same method twice: $$(R_0, f(R_0,l_1)=L_2 \oplus L_0) \ (L_2,f(L_2,K_2)= R_2 \oplus R_0)$$

A nice reference would be CryptoLecture 04 (PDF) from Daniel Boneh's crypto course on Coursera.

Introduced LaTex/MathJax.
Source Link
e-sushi
e-sushi
  • 18.1k
  • 12
  • 85
  • 235

Feistel networks were broken in DES but not triple DES. Some final AES candidates not approved also used Feistel networks 2^36$2^{36}$ plain text attacks. Reduction of 2^16$2^{16}$ possible keys for single DES: 4^48/6 = 4^8 = 2^16$4^{48/6} = 4^{8} = 2^{16}$.

First for a one round Feistel network: R0$R_0$ and f (RO$f (R_O, k_1) = R_1 \oplus L_0$, k1) = R1 xor L0 k1$k_1$ becomes known.

For two round Fiestel: Use the same method twice: (R0, f(R0,l1)=L2xorL0)$$(R_0, f(R_0,l_1)=L_2 \oplus L_0) \ (L_2,f(L_2,K_2)= R_2 \oplus R_0)$$

A nice reference would be (L2,fCryptoLecture 04 (L2,K2PDF)= R2 XOR R0 from Daniel Bineh's crypto course on Coursera.

Feistel networks were broken in DES but not triple DES. Some final AES candidates not approved also used Feistel networks 2^36 plain text attacks. Reduction of 2^16 possible keys for single DES: 4^48/6 = 4^8 = 2^16.

First for a one round Feistel network: R0 and f (RO, k1) = R1 xor L0 k1 becomes known.

For two round Fiestel: Use the same method twice: (R0, f(R0,l1)=L2xorL0) (L2,f(L2,K2)= R2 XOR R0.

Feistel networks were broken in DES but not triple DES. Some final AES candidates not approved also used Feistel networks $2^{36}$ plain text attacks. Reduction of $2^{16}$ possible keys for single DES: $4^{48/6} = 4^{8} = 2^{16}$.

First for a one round Feistel network: $R_0$ and $f (R_O, k_1) = R_1 \oplus L_0$, $k_1$ becomes known.

For two round Fiestel: Use the same method twice: $$(R_0, f(R_0,l_1)=L_2 \oplus L_0) \ (L_2,f(L_2,K_2)= R_2 \oplus R_0)$$

A nice reference would be CryptoLecture 04 (PDF) from Daniel Bineh's crypto course on Coursera.

Source Link
Jacob E Mack
Jacob E Mack
  • 173
  • 6

Feistel networks were broken in DES but not triple DES. Some final AES candidates not approved also used Feistel networks 2^36 plain text attacks. Reduction of 2^16 possible keys for single DES: 4^48/6 = 4^8 = 2^16.

First for a one round Feistel network: R0 and f (RO, k1) = R1 xor L0 k1 becomes known.

For two round Fiestel: Use the same method twice: (R0, f(R0,l1)=L2xorL0) (L2,f(L2,K2)= R2 XOR R0.