I'm a total noob when it comes to cryptography but I believe this falls under the "zero knowledge" category.

I have two associated pieces of information:

1. tag - Known by both parties. Unique per scenario.
2. identity - Known by only one party. Potentially associated to multiple tags. Comes from a pool known by both parties.

I need a way to prevent the party with the association to change the value of the identity. There are around one hundred concurrent associations per scenario. The pool of potential identities can be relatively small, even smaller than the number of tags, but can be larger too.

The most primitive option would be to hash the tag and identity together but with a possibly small pool of potential identities I fear it would be trivial to brute force the hash...

During the scenario more and more of these associations will become public. At least at that point I should be able to confirm that the other party did not modify the association. I don't really have to confirm this before then because unrevealed associations are not relevant. I just need to prevent the knowing party to pick and choose on revealing. And I need to prevent the other party from deducing the identity before the reveal.

Is such a thing even possible? How could it be done? How difficult would it be to implement?

I'm a total noob when it comes to cryptography but I believe this falls under the "zero knowledge" category.

I have two associated pieces of information:

1. tag — known by both parties. Unique per scenario.
2. identity — known by only one party. Potentially associated to multiple tags. Comes from a pool known by both parties.

I need a way to prevent the party with the association from changing the value of the identity. There are around 100 concurrent associations per scenario. The pool of potential identities can be relatively small, even smaller than the number of tags, but can be larger too.

The most primitive option would be to hash the tag and identity together but with a possibly small pool of potential identities I fear it would be trivial to brute force the hash...

During the scenario more and more of these associations will become public. At least at that point I should be able to confirm that the other party did not modify the association. I don't really have to confirm this before then, because unrevealed associations are not relevant. I just need to prevent the knowing party from picking and choosing at the time of revealing. And I need to prevent the other party from deducing the identity before the reveal.

Is such a thing even possible? How could it be done? How difficult would it be to implement?