Timeline for Simulator in Private Outsourced Computation over Outsourced Datasets
Current License: CC BY-SA 3.0
13 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr 13, 2017 at 12:48 | history | edited | CommunityBot |
replaced http://crypto.stackexchange.com/ with https://crypto.stackexchange.com/
|
|
| Jul 29, 2015 at 14:23 | comment | added | mikeazo | I figured it was a mistake. :) The simulator should mimic the real world. So if cheating can occur undetected in the real world with some probability, it should hold in the ideal world too. | |
| Jul 29, 2015 at 14:19 | comment | added | user13676 | consider a case where two parties send their private data to a malicious server, then it computes the result and sends it back to a party. My question is that in the ideal world, can we allow the adversary escape from detection with the same probability(that is negligible) as it can do in the real world? Or in the ideal world the simulator must detect the adversary's misbehavior with probability of exactly 1? | |
| Jul 29, 2015 at 14:17 | comment | added | user13676 | I said it wrong, the malicious party can escape from detection with negligible probability in the both world. I'll modify the above comment. | |
| Jul 29, 2015 at 14:15 | comment | added | mikeazo | @user13676 So client's in real world only detect malicious behavior with negligible probability? Doesn't sound like a very useful protocol. | |
| Jul 29, 2015 at 14:06 | comment | added | mikeazo | @user13676 That said, who determines whether or not cheating is taking place? In the UC world (which I am most familiar with), it would be $\mathcal{Z}$. | |
| Jul 29, 2015 at 14:04 | comment | added | mikeazo | @user13676 The simulator does not detect anything. The simulators goal is to make the two worlds indistinguishable. In particular, a quote from an answer on your other question is important to remember "the simulator typically works by running the real-world adversary". So the simulator actually acts as the adversary in some sense. | |
| Jul 29, 2015 at 13:58 | comment | added | user13676 | In the ideal model where simulator deals with the adversary, can we allow the adversary to cheat the simulator with the same probability (that is negligible) as in real world? or in the ideal model the simulator must detect all misbehavior of adversary? | |
| Jul 26, 2015 at 14:20 | comment | added | mikeazo | @user13676 you should ask that as a separate question, instead of in the comments. | |
| Jul 26, 2015 at 13:27 | comment | added | user13676 | The simulator in the example can even make the adversary believe that the zero knowledge proof is verified where it is not. | |
| Jul 26, 2015 at 13:25 | comment | added | user13676 | Why sometime simulator in the ideal world has more power than the adversary in the real world. For instance, the simulator can extract the secret value used by the other party (in particular in zero knowledge prof of knowledge) where the real world adversary has not such capability. Or the simulator can receive the other party input to the zero knowledge ideal call. see "Efficient two party protocols" page 190, full simulation oblivious transfer. | |
| Jul 26, 2015 at 12:33 | vote | accept | user13676 | ||
| Jul 26, 2015 at 2:29 | history | answered | mikeazo | CC BY-SA 3.0 |