Timeline for How much computing resource is required to brute-force RSA?
Current License: CC BY-SA 3.0
7 events
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| Apr 13, 2017 at 12:48 | history | edited | CommunityBot |
replaced http://crypto.stackexchange.com/ with https://crypto.stackexchange.com/
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| Jun 25, 2012 at 13:46 | comment | added | eggyal | Thanks, but I'd really meant that once the factorisation you give has been discovered it can then be applied wherever the given product needs to be factorised. Over forty years with vast computing resources, many such factorisations could be discovered. I find @Maeher's answer more convincing in countering this argument, as it helps me to realise that the number of such factorisations required to be generated and stored even for 1024-bit RSA moduli is so vast that it is simply not reasonable even to hope for a collision with a known key. | |
| Jun 25, 2012 at 13:27 | comment | added | fgrieu♦ | @eggyal: I updated my answer. | |
| Jun 25, 2012 at 13:26 | history | edited | fgrieu♦ | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
Update with waht may be what the OP wanted
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| Jun 25, 2012 at 12:30 | comment | added | eggyal | Thank you for all of the additional links - lots of very useful reading! I suppose my perspective was whether due consideration had been given not only to the challenge of breaking RSA today from a zero-starting point, but had also factored in 40 years of effort? | |
| Jun 25, 2012 at 12:09 | history | edited | fgrieu♦ | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
Expand with other attacks
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| Jun 25, 2012 at 11:49 | history | answered | fgrieu♦ | CC BY-SA 3.0 |