Timeline for Secure blinding factor switching at malicious server-side (Switching in One Time pad)
Current License: CC BY-SA 3.0
5 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feb 5, 2016 at 9:13 | vote | accept | user153465 | ||
| Feb 4, 2016 at 21:44 | comment | added | fgrieu♦ | @user153465: the second paragraph in the answer tries to address that. The adversary is free to compute any function of $v_1$ and $v_2$, like $v_4(v_1,v_2)=(v_1+v_2)^{v_1-v_2}$, or $v_3(v_1,v_2)=v_1\cdot v_2$, anything goes, that has no influence on the demonstration given. This is just extra added to the question's statement, obscuring it, that we want to get rid of to focus on the expressions involving $a$, or $z_1$, $z_2$ or other things not known to the adversary. | |
| Feb 4, 2016 at 9:26 | comment | added | user153465 | Thank you for the answer, it's very precise. I'm wondering why you did not discuss about $v_3$ in your answer. Why cannot we say $v_3$ contains random value $z_2$ that has already been used in $v_2$. Therefore, according to one-time-pad it may leak information as the random value has been used twice. | |
| Feb 4, 2016 at 7:21 | history | edited | fgrieu♦ | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
slightly simplify
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| Feb 4, 2016 at 7:16 | history | answered | fgrieu♦ | CC BY-SA 3.0 |