Timeline for Breaking hashless variant of the Rabin Signature system with chosen message attack
Current License: CC BY-SA 3.0
9 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
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| Nov 10, 2018 at 17:59 | comment | added | kelalaka | and this can be eliminated by redundancy; adding the last 64-bit of the message itself. ref: Menezes 8.14.i | |
| Mar 14, 2018 at 15:27 | history | edited | Squeamish Ossifrage | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
Tweak title to reflect what the signature scheme in question actually is. Incorporate the questioner's misrepresented notion of the signature scheme into the question text to clarify the original question.
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| Mar 13, 2018 at 18:52 | answer | added | Daira-Emma Hopwood | timeline score: 3 | |
| Feb 11, 2016 at 18:51 | vote | accept | user3415513 | ||
| Feb 11, 2016 at 18:04 | answer | added | poncho | timeline score: 3 | |
| Feb 11, 2016 at 18:03 | comment | added | SEJPM | Which equals no padding at all... | |
| Feb 11, 2016 at 17:47 | comment | added | user3415513 | In my system, for a message A that is a quadratic residue modulo N, the signature is x such that x^2=a mod N. | |
| Feb 11, 2016 at 17:41 | comment | added | fgrieu♦ | You can not break the Rabin Signature system (easier than factoring) when it uses a proper message padding, and the one proposed in the original article is fine. You can however break implementations with a bad message padding. Define exactly how the message to sign is transformed into a signature in your Rabin Signature system variant, and we'll be able to hint you. | |
| Feb 11, 2016 at 17:12 | history | asked | user3415513 | CC BY-SA 3.0 |