Timeline for What's the issue with Apple's backdoor?
Current License: CC BY-SA 3.0
6 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
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| Feb 18, 2016 at 19:18 | vote | accept | David | ||
| Feb 18, 2016 at 17:07 | comment | added | Chris Peikert | The data encryption key is a combination of the user passcode and a key stored securely in hardware (not the secure enclave in this case, but something else). So copying the encrypted data and brute-forcing the PIN alone will not work. | |
| Feb 18, 2016 at 14:54 | comment | added | Gilles 'SO- stop being evil' | @ChrisPeikert Oh, I wasn't familiar with the details of that case, thank you. In this case I wonder why FBI doesn't do offline enumeration. FBI might have trouble with a secure enclave (they could probably break it but it might cost a lot), but with ordinary flash memory, they can just make copies or use independent software. | |
| Feb 18, 2016 at 13:23 | comment | added | Chris Peikert | Note that the phone in question here is an iPhone 5C, which does not have a secure enclave. (I don't think it's true that a software update could convince the enclave to give up its secrets.) Apple is being asked to create a variant iOS that does not limit the number of faulty PIN attempts. This is technically feasible because on the 5C, the PIN policy is enforced by the iOS software/firmware, not by a hardware enclave. | |
| Feb 18, 2016 at 0:49 | history | edited | Gilles 'SO- stop being evil' | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
added 335 characters in body
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| Feb 18, 2016 at 0:42 | history | answered | Gilles 'SO- stop being evil' | CC BY-SA 3.0 |