Timeline for Relationship between a key stream having a high entropy and whether it is cryptically secure in a stream cipher
Current License: CC BY-SA 3.0
10 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
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| Jul 22, 2017 at 14:49 | history | edited | Squeamish Ossifrage | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
Clarify that it was unusual of RC4 to be broken by naive statistical tests on the output stream.
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| Jul 22, 2017 at 3:56 | history | edited | Squeamish Ossifrage | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
One more clarification of how attacker's computation budget is related to security parameter. Clarify citations and briefly state why we choose k >= 128 or k >= 256.
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| Jul 21, 2017 at 15:51 | history | edited | Squeamish Ossifrage | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
Clarify attacker's costs and success probability. Fix estimated energy cost of boiling Lake Geneva.
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| Jul 21, 2017 at 15:16 | comment | added | Squeamish Ossifrage | Also I suppose I should clarify that the success probability is bounded not by $1/2 + 1/2^k$ but rather by a function of the amount of work the adversary can put into it, say $1/2 + n/2^k$ for the cost of $n$ trials, so we usually pick $k$ large enough that for any imaginable values of $n$, $n/2^k$ is still negligible. | |
| Jul 21, 2017 at 15:06 | comment | added | Squeamish Ossifrage | Oops. You're right: I erred on the wrong side of that estimate. I should have said, say, $k = 100$ or picked a lower cost like boiling an Olympic-size swimming pool, which Lenstra figured to be around a 65-bit security level. | |
| Jul 21, 2017 at 13:38 | comment | added | CodesInChaos | Boiling Lake Geneva should take about $2^{99}$ SHA-256 invocations using custom hardware, not $2^{80}$. (Using SHA256 because getting efficiency data is easy for it) | |
| Jul 21, 2017 at 13:04 | history | edited | Squeamish Ossifrage | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
Remove IND-CPA citation, which is unhelpful because the correspondence between IND-CPA and the next-bit test is not made clear by the Wikipedia article.
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| Jul 21, 2017 at 5:05 | history | edited | Squeamish Ossifrage | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
Say ‘frequencies’, not ‘numbers’, of 0/1 bits. Clarify how ‘generic attacks’ on stream ciphers are less stupid than dieharder. Canonicalize order of min(\ell, k).
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| Jul 21, 2017 at 2:52 | history | edited | Squeamish Ossifrage | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
Fix wording. No semantic change.
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| Jul 21, 2017 at 1:31 | history | answered | Squeamish Ossifrage | CC BY-SA 3.0 |