Timeline for AES: a question about dual ciphers and security
Current License: CC BY-SA 3.0
15 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov 3, 2017 at 14:58 | vote | accept | Red Book 1 | ||
| S Nov 3, 2017 at 14:57 | history | bounty ended | Red Book 1 | ||
| S Nov 3, 2017 at 14:57 | history | notice removed | Red Book 1 | ||
| Nov 3, 2017 at 5:06 | answer | added | Squeamish Ossifrage | timeline score: 3 | |
| Nov 1, 2017 at 13:15 | comment | added | Red Book 1 | The link in the question should be all right now. | |
| Nov 1, 2017 at 13:14 | history | edited | Red Book 1 | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
deleted 51 characters in body
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| Nov 1, 2017 at 12:26 | comment | added | Maarten Bodewes♦ | Please fix the link in the question instead of putting that in a comment. | |
| Oct 31, 2017 at 8:34 | comment | added | Red Book 1 | Thank you. Try this: online.tugraz.at/tug_online/voe_main2.getvolltext?pCurrPk=13371 | |
| Oct 31, 2017 at 8:23 | review | Suggested edits | |||
| Oct 31, 2017 at 8:32 | |||||
| S Oct 30, 2017 at 16:46 | history | bounty started | Red Book 1 | ||
| S Oct 30, 2017 at 16:46 | history | notice added | Red Book 1 | Authoritative reference needed | |
| Oct 24, 2017 at 3:34 | comment | added | Red Book 1 | Assume all are secure (Q1). Since DCA needs large numbers of $P/C$ pairs to mount an attack, would it not be much harder at least in theory? Changing the irr. poly (say) in each round (and again for each new full encryption) would give distinct outputs even with key $K$ fixed. DCA relies on input $m$ always giving output $C$ (never $C'$ or $C''$, etc.). It also relies on knowing the cipher in question, esp. the S-box. I know ciphers with key-dependent S-boxes can be attacked with DCA up to a number of rounds (e.g. Twofish), but is this not quite a different case? | |
| Oct 23, 2017 at 18:55 | comment | added | poncho | Questions (3) and (4) are specific cases of "hey, if I take an existing cipher, and add this extra complexity, won't it make it stronger?". Unless someone is willing to spend a great deal of time exhaustively cryptanalyzing those changes, there is typically no answer. In any case, if you don't care about performance, just add additional rounds; that way, the current analysis will (mostly) still hold, and you know you won't have hurt anything... | |
| Oct 23, 2017 at 17:14 | history | edited | Red Book 1 | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
edited title
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| Oct 23, 2017 at 17:08 | history | asked | Red Book 1 | CC BY-SA 3.0 |