Timeline for Why does side-channel security focus on “shielding” rather than “jamming”?
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
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Jul 29, 2019 at 9:32 | vote | accept | leftaroundabout | ||
Jun 10, 2018 at 17:21 | comment | added | poncho | "If you need to crack each bit of the message sequentially"; you mean in parallel. In any case, the standard assumption in crypto is that the attacker knows everything about the system other than the key (and random data chosen as a part of the encryption process); it is assumed that the attacker knows how the implementation is constructed. And, if you assume that the random data used to obscure the message prevents attacks, you need to show that it does it completely, difficult for randomly constructed systems. | |
Jun 10, 2018 at 10:27 | comment | added | leftaroundabout | By exponential I didn't mean “a signal-noise ratio $S/R$ makes it $\mathcal{O}(e^{S/R})$ inefficient to intercept messages” (which as you say it doesn't), but “it makes it $\mathcal{O}((S/R)^{2\cdot\ell})$ inefficient to intercept a message of length $\ell$”. Of course this only holds if you need to crack each bit (or at least each chunk) of the message sequentially; when you can just intercept a whole transmission, know where each bit is and can attack each one individually then it's much easier, but that I would consider quite strong a-priori knowledge. | |
Jun 9, 2018 at 14:17 | history | answered | poncho | CC BY-SA 4.0 |