Timeline for How to use Homomorphic encryption for secure computing Arctan() function?
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
6 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
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| Aug 20, 2018 at 15:56 | vote | accept | Mandana Ghasemi | ||
| Aug 14, 2018 at 15:18 | comment | added | Dragos | @FlorianBourse, or the parties can have a special key generation algorithm which outputs a global public key $(pk)$ which the parties use to encrypt stuff and to a distributed decryption using shared secret keys $(sk_A, sk_B)$ whenever they want to decrypt the ciphertext. | |
| Aug 14, 2018 at 12:27 | comment | added | Florian Bourse | In an FHE setting, they could both encrypt and compute on encrypted ciphertexts that can only be decrypted by a 3rd party | |
| Aug 14, 2018 at 8:54 | comment | added | MotiNK | That's a valid point, but I still feel it's relevant to point out to whomever is asking the question the insecurity of the problem as a standalone piece. | |
| Aug 13, 2018 at 19:06 | comment | added | poncho | When we have the problem 'securely compute $F(a, b)$ without leakage, we assume that the information that the two sides get from the value $F(a, b)$ is not counted as part of the unwanted leakage. You could claim that this isn't a useful problem (because, as you point out, two queries will reveal everything), but we don't know enough about the ultimate problem to state that | |
| Aug 12, 2018 at 10:01 | history | answered | MotiNK | CC BY-SA 4.0 |