Timeline for Zero-Knowledge Challenge-Responce Protocol
Current License: CC BY-SA 3.0
9 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mar 7, 2013 at 14:42 | answer | added | xagawa | timeline score: 2 | |
| Mar 6, 2013 at 6:21 | comment | added | sashank | have you checked heliosvoting.org ? they use partial homomorphic techniques | |
| Mar 5, 2013 at 16:15 | comment | added | Thomas Lieven | I'm sorry but I still don't get why you need this ZK protocol or what it exactly is supposed to do. If an authority signs the one-way-key the voter gets the signature as well as the certificate of the signing key for verification. The voter now sends the polling station his vote, his signed public one-way-key and the certificate. Based on a PKI the polling station is now able to verify the authority's signature. There is no need to contact the authority. | |
| Mar 5, 2013 at 13:31 | history | tweeted | twitter.com/#!/StackCrypto/status/308932783584194560 | ||
| Mar 5, 2013 at 10:04 | answer | added | D.W. | timeline score: 1 | |
| Mar 4, 2013 at 18:31 | comment | added | user5169 | Thank you very much Mr Thomas. I also use this one-way hashed sign key for the voter to vote. The problem I have is when the e-voting authorities communicate (the polling station and the registry authority, because they have to communicate using the zero-knowledge challenge-response protocol). Thank you very much for your time :))) | |
| Mar 4, 2013 at 16:47 | comment | added | Thomas Lieven | I did not have a look at the paper you mentioned but in e-voting a voter usually gets something like an authentication token or a one-way signing key signed by an authority. For privacy reasons these signatures are often blinded. | |
| Mar 4, 2013 at 13:00 | review | First posts | |||
| Mar 4, 2013 at 13:03 | |||||
| Mar 4, 2013 at 12:40 | history | asked | user5169 | CC BY-SA 3.0 |