Timeline for Password Hashing Security Using Scrypt & Argon2
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
6 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 13, 2019 at 13:26 | comment | added | SamG101 | @ramalaytor (replying to comment), When Alice wishes to communicate with Bob, she will generate ephemeral ECC keys. Her ephemeral public key will be signed with her permanent private key. This will be known to Bob, so he can verify Alice's ephemeral public key. I am using ephemeral ECC keys to maintain forward secrecy. | |
| Jul 8, 2019 at 21:52 | comment | added | rmalayter | I assumed the “shared secret” was a password used for authenticating the key exchange, not the result of the key exchange. I guess I misunderstood the home-grown protocol. If there’s no authentication of the KEX that’s another major problem. | |
| Jul 8, 2019 at 6:51 | comment | added | Meir Maor | I too upvoted and am not removing my vote, despite the current situation where your answer(@forest) below is better and has significantly lower score. I wouldn't say the answer here is wrong, but it catches only part of the mistake. | |
| Jul 8, 2019 at 0:41 | comment | added | forest | Although I upvoted this answer, I just noticed now that it's wrong. OP does not need to "simply use Argon2". As @EllaRose says, he should be using HKDF if he needs a KDF, not a PBKDF. | |
| Jul 7, 2019 at 15:31 | comment | added | Ella Rose | Why should they pass the output of a key agreement process to Argon2 instead of something like HKDF? Even if passwords were the source of secrecy in the private ECC keys, then using Argon2 on the shared secret is still applying password hashing to the wrong part of the process. | |
| Jul 7, 2019 at 8:55 | history | answered | rmalayter | CC BY-SA 4.0 |