Timeline for Is encrypted e-mail sent over TLS 1.3 a form of "forward secrecy" (similar to something like Signal)?
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
4 events
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| Oct 15, 2019 at 14:39 | comment | added | philomathic_life | If one requires the key be stored on some hardware token that prevents the key from being extracted—ignoring things like power analysis—and forcing such a key to only exist on it, then so be it. | |
| Oct 15, 2019 at 14:38 | comment | added | philomathic_life | @SteffenUllrich, I suppose my question can be generalized to the whole notion of "forward secrecy" which Squeamish Ossifrage touches on. It appears to me that if its usage in regards to Signal is similar to the "typical" usage; then "forward secrecy" must expressly not consider end devices since Signal uses a static key to decrypt older messages. Consequently, in an imaginary world where e-mails are never stored on other devices (e.g., MTAs); then even if I use a static GPG key to encrypt the message, it would constitute as "forward secrecy". | |
| Oct 14, 2019 at 19:39 | comment | added | Steffen Ullrich | The OP is explicitly asking about the use of the current way mail delivery is done (i.e. "e-mail sent from one message transfer agent (MTA) to another") and is not asking if the SMTP protocol can be reused in different setups (as proposed by you, i.e. MUA to recipient MTA) to provide forward secrecy. | |
| Oct 14, 2019 at 15:34 | history | answered | R.. GitHub STOP HELPING ICE | CC BY-SA 4.0 |