Timeline for Why is a MAC verification algorithm required when we can simply create a new MAC and compare the received one with the one calculated?
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
9 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
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| Jul 12, 2020 at 0:05 | history | became hot network question | |||
| Jul 11, 2020 at 18:16 | comment | added | kelalaka | The answer is no. See the related question Are there any non Canonical Verifiable Cryptographic MACs | |
| Jul 11, 2020 at 17:27 | vote | accept | Daud | ||
| Jul 11, 2020 at 17:09 | answer | added | SAI Peregrinus | timeline score: 2 | |
| Jul 11, 2020 at 16:32 | comment | added | user80928 | Assuming MAC calculation is time/cpu/memory-intensive, I could imagine cases where it could be beneficial to compare partially-calculated MAC with the remainder of (potentially cancellable) computation running in parallel, assuming the MAC algorithm would allow for it. Having said that, I didn't come across such case. | |
| Jul 11, 2020 at 16:25 | comment | added | poncho | Actually, I have come across symmetric MAC algorithms which supported a verification method that wasn't a straight-forward 'compute the MAC tag and compare'. However, I don't recall any particular advantage those alternative approaches gave, and in any case, for essentially all the MACs we use in practice, we do follow the 'recompute-and-compare' method... | |
| Jul 11, 2020 at 16:22 | history | edited | Daud | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
added 95 characters in body
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| Jul 11, 2020 at 16:17 | answer | added | user80928 | timeline score: 2 | |
| Jul 11, 2020 at 16:05 | history | asked | Daud | CC BY-SA 4.0 |