Timeline for Why is a MAC verification algorithm required when we can simply create a new MAC and compare the received one with the one calculated?
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
4 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 13, 2020 at 13:19 | comment | added | SAI Peregrinus | Yeah, there's no good library I can think of that doesn't include it. But there are some terrible old libraries that don't. Edited to address your points. | |
| Jul 13, 2020 at 13:18 | history | edited | SAI Peregrinus | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
Address Maarten Bodewes' comments
|
| Jul 12, 2020 at 0:38 | comment | added | Maarten Bodewes♦ | "Some cryptographic libraries might require you to implement this comparison yourself, since it's trivial," I think in general you will want to do a time-constant compare, and I think you can therefore not call it "trivial". Actually, it is relatively error prone because of it. Another common implementation mistake is to rely on the size of the received authentication tag and only compare the minimum amount of bits / bytes rather than one configured in the protocol. | |
| Jul 11, 2020 at 17:09 | history | answered | SAI Peregrinus | CC BY-SA 4.0 |