Timeline for Combining CTR and ECB modes to prevent attacks
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
7 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
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| Nov 11, 2020 at 11:25 | comment | added | Maarten Bodewes♦ | An earlier revision also contained a reference to Bi-IGE mode (infinite garble extension). However, that seems to require a large / random IV (depending on which version of the protocol you reference). So I've removed it for now, using FPE seems to be more relevant here anyway. | |
| Nov 9, 2020 at 14:44 | history | edited | Maarten Bodewes♦ | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
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| Nov 9, 2020 at 12:07 | vote | accept | ManRow | ||
| Nov 8, 2020 at 17:22 | history | edited | Maarten Bodewes♦ | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
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| Nov 8, 2020 at 14:44 | comment | added | Maarten Bodewes♦ | Whoops, that CBC thing with non-random IV in the original answer was of course nonsense, the problem is that an adversary can guess a plaintext and then force the encryption of the same block, leaking information about other encrypted messages. This is something that is not not avoided by your scheme either, by the way (and it cannot be fully solved without using probabalistic encryption, but it can be somewhat mitigated by relying on the entire message). | |
| Nov 8, 2020 at 14:37 | history | edited | Maarten Bodewes♦ | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
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| Nov 8, 2020 at 14:29 | history | answered | Maarten Bodewes♦ | CC BY-SA 4.0 |